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Abstract 
The international monetary system is a fundamental building bloc of the international 
economic system. However, limited academic attention has been paid to the connection 
between a monetary system’s design and international economic stability. By using the 
Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), this qualitative research project addresses this gap by 
contrasting the Bretton Woods gold-exchange system (1944-1971) and the fiat currency 
system (1971-present) in which both the United States is assumed to be the hegemon and 
issuer of the global currency reserve. Ultimately, it is tested whether the fiat currency system 
has led to greater instability or not. This explanatory research provides an in-depth 
comparative account in which the dynamics of monetary systems are explained in, leaving 
substantial room for further academic research.  
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Introduction  
History shows that all applied monetary systems around the world – from Mesopotamia to the 
current one - eventually transition into newly designed systems that more accurately reflect 
the power position of the relevant stakeholders at the time. Although the core of monetary 
systems never changes – the use of a generally accepted medium of exchange that determines 
a certain measure of wealth – the underlying system is in an evolutionary flux. While ten 
thousand years ago bartering, the most elementary system of trade, formed the pinnacle of 
trading among communities of hunters and gatherers, the increasingly complex trading 
systems gradually led to more convenient and efficient means of exchange: gold and silver 
coins. Historical accounts and archaeological findings show that empires from all around the 
world – Romans, Greeks, Egyptians, Byzantines, Mayas and Incas – cherished the use of 
these scarce -and therefore precious- metals for its portable and divisible qualities 
(Middelkoop, 2014). The essence of today’s international monetary system is therefore no 
different than ten thousand years ago.  
 Nevertheless, the last five centuries the global reserve currency of the international 
monetary system, and its design, has always heavily depended on the political hegemon in the 
international system (Kirshner, 2003). Although the Drachma was the dominant currency 
during the hegemony of the Greek empire, and the Gold Solidus was the dominant means of 
exchange during the Byzantine Empire, it was Portugal that issued the first truly 
intercontinental currency during the 15
th
 and 16
th
 century. It was then the hegemon Spain that 
subsequently dominated global commerce during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century with the Spanish 
dollar or “pieces of eight” (Ganziro & Vambery, 2016). While global trade flourished under 
the Dutch East Asia Company (VOC) it was the Dutch guilder that served as a de facto global 
currency reserve during the 17
th
 century and early 1700, a role that was overtaken by France 
in most of the 18
th
 century. After the 1815 Congress of Vienna the British Empire dominated 
global commerce for over a century with the sterling until the Bretton Woods Agreement in 
1944 effectively transformed the U.S. Dollar into the lynchpin of today’s monetary system 
(Ganziro & Vambery, 2016). Based on the hegemonic holders of these dominant international 
currencies a parallel could be drawn in which the rise and fall of a hegemonic power seems to 
equate with the rise and fall of the reserve currency status in the ‘incumbent’ monetary 
system. Although hegemony remains a diffuse concept among scholars, it is agreed in the 
literature that the United States took up the hegemonic political and economic leadership role 
in the years following World War II (Stein, 1984). However, it was mainly the financial crisis 
of 2008 following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. that sparked global 
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doubts about the status of the U.S. dollar in the monetary system and which heavily 
contributed to an intensifying discussion about a decline of U.S. hegemony in general 
(Lachmann, 2014). Indeed, in the aftermath of the financial crisis IPE-authors have 
increasingly written about efforts of BRICS countries to reduce its dependency on the U.S. 
dollar as global currency reserve. By means of, inter alia, the internationalization of the 
Renminbi (Kwon, 2015), the explosive increase of bilateral currency swap agreements 
(Yelerey, 2016) and an increase reliance on commodities such as gold and silver (Rickards, 
2014), these countries are not only better equipped to mitigate financial risks during the next 
financial crisis, but also to execute a more independent monetary policy (Kwon, 2015). It 
should also be stressed that the last two centuries have shown that the average timespan of a 
monetary system is roughly 30-40 years, and that with every transition there is a potential for 
a larger role for challengers of the current monetary order. When following this cyclical 
nature of monetary systems and the potential change of hegemons in these systems, this 
would mean we are overdue for a new system, as the current design of the international 
monetary system is 46 years of age (Rickards, 2014). Moreover, these efforts of the BRICS 
countries could in theory lead to higher instability in the international economic system, or 
even signal a trend to a new global monetary order.  
 Irrespective whether this scenario might become a reality or not, the cyclical nature of 
a monetary system and the transition of one hegemon –with its global currency reserve - to 
the other appears to have a connection to power relations and global economic (in-) stability. 
Further research in this dimension could provide a broader understanding of power relations, 
the rationale behind foreign policy decisions, global financial crises and the stability of the 
international economic system in general. Specifically, in order to analyse the nature of such a 
monetary system a comparative analysis will be conducted between the two different 
monetary systems, both in which the United States is defined as a hegemon: the Bretton 
Woods gold exchange standard (1944-1971) and the fiat currency standard (1971-present). 
The year 1971 is a pivotal moment in this research; the year when President Nixon suspended 
the convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold or other reserve assets. This so-called Nixon 
Shock serves as a clear demarcation line between two different monetary systems, and is a 
game changer in defining the rules of the new monetary game. Nevertheless, despite this 
shock, the United States is still seen as a hegemon and its global currency reserve is still a 
widely trusted linchpin of the system. By contrasting both systems, the aim of the research is 
to expose the roots of the current fiat currency system with the United States as hegemon and 
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its influence on the stability of the international economic system. The brings us to the 
following research question: 
 
 
Has a decline of the Bretton Woods hegemonic order increased the instability of the 
international economic system? 
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Literature review  
The review underlines the link in academic work between the nature of monetary systems - 
fiat or commodity based – and global power relations, while it also establishes the importance 
of the concept of monetary power in the literature. It is evident that much work has been 
written on this general link, while there is also extensive research on the concept of money 
and stability. Moreover, the literature extensively elaborates on various forms of monetary, 
currency, or reserve power and their relevance for a state’s power capabilities and influence 
on the world stage. However, comparative analyses about the performance of these links seem 
to be lacking, such as this comparative qualitative research analysis on U.S. monetary power 
and international economic stability during two different monetary systems.  
 Therefore, this review covers the general academic work on the nature of international 
monetary systems and the connection of these systems to international stability. An additional 
section about the discussion about the dollar as global currency reserve is included, which is 
relevant as the observed trends could possibly undermine the pinnacle of the current monetary 
system: the dollar. Finally, a brief background of the hegemonic stability theory in IR is 
provided; a theory that could enhance our analytical understanding of this research, and shed 
light on the research question.  
 
General overview of the literature on international monetary systems 
The academic literature proves to be rather limited when taking into account the nature of 
monetary systems and their specific impact on power relations or international stability. In 
fact, there are well-developed accounts about the evolution of monetary systems, separate 
accounts on the functioning of ‘commodity money’ and ‘fiat money’, and analyses on the 
international status of the world’s currencies (D’Arista, 2009; Bordo & Eichengreen, 1993; 
Triffin, 1964; Ledoit & Lotz, 2011; Chey, 2012). However, an explicit comparative analysis 
of the nature of monetary systems and their eventual impact on international stability 
constitutes a gap in the IPE literature. An author who writes extensively, though, on currency 
power, and connects currency internationalization and state power is Benjamin Cohen, who 
could be labeled as the academic authority on international monetary affairs (Cohen, 2015). 
Cohen has written several articles on the concept of monetary power (2008) and has made 
comparative analyses of the euro, dollar and the rising renminbi as top international 
currencies (2011).  
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Monetary power and its connection to international relations and/or stability  
Although the literature on monetary power is not extensive, the authors that do write about 
this concept stress that this form of power is highly relevant and could have significant 
ramifications of a state’s political relations with others. David Andrews elaborates in his book 
International Monetary Power (2006) on a state-centric approach where he perceives 
international monetary power as a ‘relational property’ (Halabi, 2008). In other words, a 
change in monetary relations causes a change in the policy calculus or behavior of another 
state. The scenario when ‘an adjustment of balance of payments disequilibrium by state A, 
which causes state B to abandon preferred policies’ would be an evident example of monetary 
power (Halabi, 2008, pp. 100). Benjamin Cohen (2008) on the other hand refers to monetary 
power as the ‘driving form of power’ (p.458) and states that this form of power is a more 
effective means of influence and persuasion than military power. He maintains that the power 
to delay or deflect these balance of payments disequilibria is the core of monetary power 
(Cohen, 2005). Excessive imbalances or unsustainable payments disequilibria constitute a 
destabilizing effect on a state’s policy independence. This means that the more capacity or 
power a state has to avoid these adjustment costs compared to other states then, ceteris 
paribus, the greater its monetary power and total amount of power at the international level 
(Cohen, 2005). Moreover, Jonathan Kirshner (1995) provides a generalized state-centric 
framework in his book Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International 
Monetary Power. In this book Kirshner further expands on the concept of monetary power as 
a form of state power that could be used as an instrument of coercive power to advance 
domestic and international interests (Kirshner, 2003).  
 Nevertheless, there is a scarce amount of literature focusing on or referring to the 
connection between U.S. monetary power and the stability of the international system 
specifically. Although this connection is missing, the available work of scholars in the field 
has focused mainly on specific dimensions of monetary power. Norrlof (2014), for instance, 
has developed a quantitative assessment of the U.S. monetary capabilities, while Kirshner 
(2003) has expanded on the concept of money itself together with its political implications. 
Kindleberger (1973) has focused in his work on the U.S. hegemony in a general sense, while 
also expanding on the concept of monetary power. He defines the scope of a (hegemonic) 
monetary power by five distinct roles that it needs to fulfil: maintaining a relatively open 
market for distress goods (1), providing contra cyclical, or at least, long-term lending (2), 
acting as a lender of last resort at times of crisis (3), policing a relatively stable system of 
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exchange rates (4), and ensuring some degree of coordination of macro-economic policies (5) 
(Helleiner & Kirshner, 2014).  
 When specifically looking to literature on the concept of global economic or financial 
stability itself, it is evident that there is no frequently used overarching definition and that the 
concept is rather used intuitively instead. Only the IMF (2016) seems to concretely identify 
indicators for global economic stability – (1) financial crises, (2) large swings in economic 
activity, (3) high levels of inflation and (4) excessive volatility in foreign exchange and 
financial markets – but fails however to provide an operationalization in which these 
indicators could be measured. Generally speaking, when the literature refers to economic 
instability it is often broadly associated with a large decline of an economy’s output, rising 
unemployment levels and a loss of purchasing power. Despite the absence of this definition, 
there is ample research on how financial crises - especially the financial crisis of 2007/2008 – 
caused economic and financial instability in the broadest sense. Still, the focus is mainly on 
the causes for the financial crises and less on the concept of global economic (in-s) stability 
itself. For the causes of this financial crisis, authors point, inter alia, to the lack of financial 
regulation and oversight, complicated and risky financial products – such as credit default 
swaps and derivatives – and the heavily interconnected nature of the global financial system 
(Fligstein & Roehrkasse, 2016; Lastra & Wood, 2010; Spiegel, 2011; Summers, 2000; 
Claessens & Kose, 2013).  
 
The discussion about the U.S. dollar as global currency reserve  
It is clear that the financial crisis of 2008 sparked, or at least contributed to the intensity of the 
debate about the status of the U.S. dollar as the global currency reserve. This discussion is 
relevant for the research, as the dollar has formed the basis – although in different forms and 
monetary designs – of the post-war international monetary architecture. Undermining or 
strengthening this pillar of the monetary system could thus theoretically have wide-ranging 
economic and political ramifications. Especially, in the last three years the amount of 
academic work on this discussion has rapidly expanded. It should be noted though that fierce 
debates about its status generally have taken place around significant monetary or financial 
developments. The Nixon shock in 1971, for instance, led to renewed debate among IPE 
scholars about the functioning of monetary systems and how the U.S. dollar would function in 
the newly evolved fiat currency system (Middelkoop, 2014). Another example would be the 
discussion on the floors of the United States Congress when the dollar dramatically lost half 
of its purchasing power in the period between 1977 and 1981, and a short-lived dollar panic 
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ensued. Retrospectively, it has been argued that the dollar almost ceased to function as the 
global currency reserve in that period of time (Rickards, 2014).  
 Still, although scholars differ in their position regarding about the status of the U.S. 
dollar and the events and/or processes that threaten its existence, there is one observation that 
all authors agree on: monetary systems inevitably evolve, which also implies that the U.S. 
dollar as the current global currency reserve will eventually cease to exist and be replaced by 
another currency or basket of currencies. Moreover, there is consensus that at the moment of 
writing no other currency can match the dollar’s appeal as an investment medium or reserve 
asset, the two roles that matter the most in geopolitical terms (Cohen, 2008; Middelkoop, 
2014; Chey, 2012). The disagreement however revolves around the question regarding the 
resilience of the U.S. dollar as global currency reserve. There are roughly two camps; on the 
one hand the declinists argue that the dollar is already in demise and they point to the inherent 
flaws in the current design of the international monetary system originating from the Bretton 
Woods Agreement signed in 1944. For them it is waiting for fresh snow to trigger a 
devastating avalanche in which the dollar will be replaced by a new currency reserve system 
(Eichengreen, 2010; Kirshner, 2003; Middelkoop, 2014; Rickards, 2014). On the other hand, 
there is the camp that acknowledges the flaws of the monetary system and the challenges to 
the U.S. dollar, but stress that the U.S. dollar is resilient enough in the years ahead (Cohen, 
2015; Strange, 2016). Cohen (2015) for instance writes in his book Currency Power that the 
U.S. dollar is likely to remain the leading global currency in the near future despite its 
challenges. Cohen argues that there are still other forms of power (besides monetary power) 
that uphold the international monetary system with the U.S. dollar as lynchpin. Here he points 
to power resources, such as America’s rather advanced level of financial sector, network 
externalities, her wide range of political ties and a vast military reach (Cohen, 2015). 
Helleiner and Kirshner (2009) argue in their book The Future of the Dollar that the United 
States still garners substantial political and economic benefits with the U.S. dollar as the 
global currency reserve. They maintain however that the dollar has become more volatile in 
world markets, while they also observe a trend in which an increasing amount of states switch 
to non-dollar instruments in their transactions (Helleiner & Kirshner, 2009). 
 Regardless of the validity of any camp’s argumentation, it is arguably true that an 
increasing amount of research – especially after the 2008 financial crisis - points to global 
pressures that undermine the legitimacy of U.S. global currency reserve, and stress the 
internationalization of the renminbi and the rise of other currencies (Jenkins & Zelenbaba, 
2012; Kwon, 2015). It is therefore not surprising that an increasing amount of policy briefs 
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recommend redesigns and the remodelling of the current international monetary system 
(Amato & Fantacci, 2014). Among them is the work of the 1999 Nobel Prize winner in 
economics Robert A. Mundell who advocates the launching of a new world currency (Duran, 
2015; Staszczak, 2015; Mundell, 2003), and the work of Barry Eichengreen that foresees a 
basket of major currencies in the near future, which will serve as the new global currency 
reserve replacing the dollar (Eichengreen, 2010).  
 
Hegemonic Stability Theory in IR 
Whether it is neorealism, neoliberal intuitionalism or constructivism within the field of IR the 
polarity and stability of the international system, and its fluctuations, could be seen as a key 
topic in IR (Stein, 1984; Webb & Krasner, 1989; Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2010). The level 
of (in-) stability has the potential to have wide ranging implications for international politics 
(Young, 2010; Cohen, 2008). The theory provides a compelling narrative that could explain 
international (economic) stability. Having it origins arguably in the book The World in 
Depression: 1929-1939 of Charles P. Kindleberger, an extensive amount of literature exists 
on the validity and limitations of the theory. It has been used to explain international stability 
under the hegemonic leadership of Great Britain in the 19
th
 century and the United States in 
the post-WWII era (Stein, 1984; Milner, 1998). However, there is also academic work that 
demonstrates its limitations and the theory’s limited scope (Snidal, 1985).  
 Moreover, a hegemon is assumed to have power, but there is ambiguity and 
disagreement how this power is achieved or which variables constitute a state’s power status. 
There are (neo-realist) scholars who break down the concept of ‘power’ into power 
capabilities, such as size of population and territory resource endowment, economic 
capability, military strength, political stability and competence (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 
2010). However, other scholars argue that monetary power – and their relation to monetary 
systems - needs to be given a more prominent place, as it arguably stands at the nexus of 
mainstream international relations and is the driving force behind all other forms of power 
(Andrews, 2006; Cohen, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical framework  
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Hegemonic Stability Theory   
The theoretical backbone of this research is the hegemonic stability theory (HST), which is 
regarded by some to be first coined by Charles P. Kindleberger in his book The World in 
Depression: 1929-1939 (Milner, 1998). According to him, the absence of a hegemon in the 
interwar period that was capable ánd willing (read: the United States) to enforce the rules of 
the global economic system contributed to the turbulence, economic misery and instability 
during this period of time (Webb. & Krasner, 1989). The theory provides the building block 
that the international economic system is more likely to remain stable when a single state is 
the hegemon or dominant world power. It asserts that a hegemonic power creates a stable 
international economic order that remains stable until a relative decline of the hegemon’s 
power paves the way for a new global structure where one state or a group of states 
challenges the ‘incumbent’ hegemonic order (Stein, 1984). It is commonly assumed in the 
literature that after World War II this role was taken up by the United States who was able to 
deploy a so-called ‘preponderance of power’ (Keohane, 1984).  
 Nevertheless, although the United States could theoretically be labelled as a hegemon 
in the aftermath of WWII, not all authors agree that the United States has remained this 
powerful hegemon in the decades that followed. In fact, Arthur Stein (1984), for instance, 
maintains that the United States was already in decline in the late 60s and states that “the 
decline of American economic hegemony became fully manifest in 1971, when the United 
States transformed the post-war economic order by simultaneously instituting an import 
surcharge and refusing to exchange gold for dollars. With these measures, it knocked out the 
monetary and commercial underpinnings of post-war international economic relationships” 
(Stein, 1984, pp. 381-382). However, generally speaking, the United States is still considered 
as today’s world hegemon despite a possible relative economic and political decline. Despite 
this hegemonic status, the nature of its monetary power – corresponding with the gold-
exchange standard or fiat currency standard – has arguably shifted in the more than 70 years 
that the United States dominates the world’s economic and political spheres.  
 The theory itself builds on two fundamental assumptions: (1) on the one hand it 
assumes that the presence of a hegemonic power leads to a stable international economic 
system, and that it provides international public goods, like a free trade regime, for which it is 
“willing to bear the full costs of the provision” (Snidal, 1985, p. 581). The prerequisite for the 
provision of these public goods is allegedly that the benefit for the hegemon of the public 
good outweighs the total cost of the effective provision. (2) On the other hand, the theory 
assumes that all smaller states in this hegemonic order are in the privileged position to have 
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higher relative gains than the net benefits of the hegemon providing these public goods 
(Snidal, 1985). In other words, these states take up the ‘free-rider role’ profiting from the 
hegemonic leadership that is capable ánd willing to enforce its footprint on the international 
economic system. However, the moment not all ‘smaller states’ benefit from the system, one 
relevant empirical implication of the theory maintains that these states will turn against the 
hegemon, or at least find ways to create new structures where their interests are perceived to 
be better met (Snidal, 1985). Moreover, one could also deduct from the theory that the erosion 
of the hegemon’s power will negatively affect its ability to supply public goods and therefore 
lead to destabilization of the international economic system (Guerrieri & Padoan, 1986).  
 
The concept of power  
An underlying key notion of the hegemonic stability theory is an asymmetrical power 
distribution in the international economic system. However, it should be noted that the 
concept of power remains a highly intuitive and diffuse concept with a wide range of 
interpretations and forms (Baldwin, 1979). Although operational accounts of forms of power 
have been formulated in the literature to tackle particular research problems with a unique 
contextual background, the formulation of one coherent and universal theory of power seems 
to be beyond our capacity (Dahl, 1957). According to Dahl (1957), the intuitive understanding 
most people have of all forms of power is when “actor A has power over B to the extent that 
he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957, p.202-203). 
However, still this definition causes definitional difficulties; the question arises to what extent 
could power be equated with concepts, such as influence, control and autonomy? (Baldwin, 
1979). The perceived ‘power’ observation that A could cause B to do something it otherwise 
would not do, does not necessarily mean that B does not influence A at all. Both the scope 
and domain of all analyzed actors in power relations are thus essential to specify, but still 
prone to subjectivity. Another difficulty relates to the actual power resources that define an 
actor’s power status. In principle, anything could be used to influence, control or force 
another actor to do something another actor would not otherwise do. How do we know 
whether we don’t exclude a source of power; or how do know that the analyzed power 
resource is the main driver behind the observed causation? A simple example that shows this 
caveat of causality is the distinction between ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’, the term first 
coined by Joseph Nye (1990) in the 1990s in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature 
of American Power. About this distinction, he writes later: “when one country gets other 
countries to want what it wants-might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the 
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hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants.” (Nye, 2004, p. 76). 
Following this line, however, it would still be too simplistic to perceive these two forms of 
power as mutually exclusive as it is most likely that the blend of these two together lead to the 
observed causation. Another complex dimension of power resources, according to Baldwin 
(1979), refers to the politico-historical context in which a certain power resource is placed. In 
the 1600s, for instance, crude oil would not have qualified as a power resource for Britain, 
while in the 20
th
 century this commodity was arguably seen as the ‘black gold’ and a powerful 
resource that contributed to the state’s powerful development (More, 2009). Lastly, power 
resources could also roughly be divided into economic and political power resources, in 
which economic resources generally tend to be more liquid and interchangeable than the 
political resources. This is because the value of economic resources is generally speaking 
easier to standardize and compare; whereas the worth and revenue of petroleum fields or 
factories (economic power resources) could be converted into a standardized measure of 
value, being the chairman of the African Union (AU) has, for instance, no standardized value 
that could be converted into other political power resources (Baldwin, 1979). Nevertheless, it 
should also be stressed that both power resources are highly interconnected and both 
resources could have implications and a powerful influence on the other.  
 In other words, the extensive reasoning above shows that breaking down the concept 
of power (resources) academically is more complicated than this notion would feel intuitively. 
Indeed, the application of power in a general sense would leave too much room for potential 
confounding variables in this research. For this reason, the scope of this research is limited to 
the concept of ‘monetary power’ of the United States. This will be mainly determined by the 
three core monetary sources within the design of the analyzed monetary system: (a) its 
international liquidity position, (b) its borrowing capacity and its owned reserves (c). With the 
background that according to Benjamin Cohen (2008) monetary power is the ‘driving form of 
power’ (p.458) and arguably heavily defines other forms of power, the concept of monetary 
power would prove a fruitful starting point for this research. Moreover, breaking down 
‘monetary power’, consisting of mostly economic resources, could provide the reader a more 
comprehensive understanding of the nature of the two monetary systems that will be 
compared. Although this rather limited scope provides a more meaningful comparative 
analysis, it is simultaneously a caveat for the hegemonic stability theory, which arguably 
involves the total spectrum of power. Still, the concept of monetary power is arguably a 
helpful tool to analyse and compare the different designs of international monetary systems 
and their link to (in-) stability. The nature of an international monetary system is highly 
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interconnected with the nature of monetary power a state holds; this holds especially true for 
U.S. monetary power, given the powerful role of the U.S. dollar in the international monetary 
system since 1944.   
 
International economic stability  
When measuring the concept of international economic stability it should be noted at first that 
the research is focusing on cross-border economic stability, and not solely on the narrower 
scope of monetary stability. The concept of ‘monetary stability’ is often equated with both 
internal price stability and exchange rate stability in relation to foreign markets (Duisenberg, 
1997). However, the focus of this research is on the systemic level of international economic 
stability, moving beyond of just the concept of monetary stability. Physical money is often 
taken for granted as a means of exchange, but it is in fact the design of the international 
monetary system that stands at the core of the meaning and value of these notes. Indeed, 
‘money’ or currency and its influence on a state’s economy could not be underestimated in an 
increasingly digitalized and globalized world where capital (and thus money) is transferred in 
a split second. Whether it is just a $100 bill in your hand, or digital entries showing the 
balance of your online investment portfolio, it is ultimately the design of the international 
monetary system that determines the real worth of this currency and a state’s monetary 
flexibility.  
 The design of an international monetary system thus not only affects a state’s 
monetary power, but also impacts - on the macro-level - global flows of trade and investment 
(Cohen, 2011), which in turn have the potential to weaken or strengthen other economic 
indicators. The established connection between the international monetary system and these 
economic indicators – determining the level of stability of the international economic system 
– has contributed to the research’ focus on the international level. In order to operationalize 
global economic stability - and given the limited academic research on a clear definition - it 
has been chosen to apply four powerful indicators of the IMF. These indicators need to be 
avoided when ensuring global economic stability: (amount of) financial crises (1), large 
swings in economic activity (2), high inflation (3) and excessive volatility in foreign exchange 
and financial markets (4) (IMF, 2016). The fact that the IMF has not further operationalized 
these indicators, has also presented an opportunity to define them in this analysis with the 
available academic literature.  
 
Case selection and methodology  
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Case selection 
Given the U.S. dollar as the global currency reserve, together with its hegemonic status on the 
world stage, this research focuses specifically on the United States and its role in the 
international monetary system. As the United States arguably took up the global leadership 
role after WWII – and is still commonly assumed to be world’s hegemon – it is academically 
worthwhile to contrast two differently designed monetary systems, in which both systems the 
dollar acted as the global currency reserve. This qualitative research thus analyzes the 
dynamics of these monetary systems – and the nature and extent of U.S. monetary systems 
within – and their impact on international economic stability. By contrasting this connection 
of each separate monetary system to this form of stability, it could lead to a nuanced 
conclusion, falsifying or confirming the hypothesis above.  
 The fundamental key of the research thus revolves around the question whether or not 
the Hegemonic Stability Theory is definitive in explaining the current level and nature of 
global economic stability. Or whether the current design and nature of the international 
monetary system is an inherently destabilizing factor impacting this form of stability. 
Specifically, in order to assess the decline of the Bretton Woods hegemonic order and its 
impact on the stability of the international economic system, the above-mentioned monetary 
systems serve as case studies that are to be compared in this qualitative research: 
 
Case study I: The Bretton Woods gold-exchange standard. This system was in operation 
between the signing of the Bretton Woods Agreement in July 1944 and the Nixon Shock, the 
decision by the Nixon administration on August 15
th
, 1971 to unilaterally terminate the 
convertibility of the U.S. Dollar into gold or other reserve assets.  
 
Case study II: The fiat currency system. This system has been – mostly - in operation since 
the Nixon Shock on August 15
th
, 1971, and fully since March 1973 
 
The evident demarcation line between both case studies is the decision by the Nixon 
administration to unilaterally terminate the convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold or other 
reserve assets (Irwin, 2013). This decision serves as a transition point from one monetary 
system into the other; the gold-exchange standard that has been transformed into the fiat 
currency standard of today 
 In order to adequately address the research question, a deliberate choice has been 
made for a qualitative research design. The first and foremost advantage of this approach is 
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that it provides deeper understanding of the dynamics and processes at play behind a 
monetary system. The focus on a large database, or numerical values would leave out the 
understanding behind these numbers; an observation that is crucial, as the design of a 
monetary system mainly provides the rather complex meaning behind these numbers. A large 
government debt or a specific balance sheet of a central bank could, for instance, be 
acceptable or even positive in a fiat currency system on the short-term, while it could possibly 
be destructive in a gold-exchange standard. The gradual development of a gold-exchange 
system and its transition into a fiat currency system requires explanation at every step, as it 
transforms the understanding and meaning of the relevant quantitative data. Another reason 
why a quantitative approach is less suitable than a qualitative one is because of the limited 
amount of cases (read: monetary systems). With available data on modern day economic 
indicators, we could only discern five major monetary systems (the classical gold standard 
1880-1914, the period 1918 – 1939 when the monetary system faced multiple redesigns and 
experiments, including the gold exchange standard 1925- 1931 (Triffin, 1964), the gold-
exchange system 1945-1971 and the fiat currency system between 1971 - now) (Bordo & 
Eichengreen, 1993). While a quantitative method would be more conducive to analyze large 
(read: hundreds or thousands) amounts of subjects or datasets, the limited amount of relevant 
cases has contributed to the decision to apply a qualitative methodology instead, and focus on 
a narrower but more in-depth scope of only two cases. The connected inherent limitation of 
the research is therefore that the results are only based on the two specifically chosen 
monetary systems, which thus undermines the generalizability of the study.  
 Moreover, given the observation that the academic literature in this field is 
underdeveloped, this in-depth analysis could also inspire and trigger the generation of new 
ideas or lead to the creation of subfields for future qualitative or quantitative research. 
Therefore, the large amount of different conditions, processes and adaptions of monetary 
systems that are involved, the highly psychological character of this research, and the 
complexity of a widely internationalized system are factors that support the decision to apply 
a qualitative research model.  
 
Methodology 
Specifically, in order to achieve a smooth comparative analysis of U.S. monetary power and 
its eventual impact on international economic stability, the method of concomitant variations 
will be applied (Lijphart, 1971). In this derivative of Mill’s popular method of difference the 
focus is not merely on the conventional ‘presence or absence of operative variables’ (Lijphart, 
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1971, pp. 688). Instead, it focuses on ‘the variations of the operative variables and relates 
these to each other’ (Lijphart, 1971, pp. 688). The relationship between these operative 
variables also provides room for interactions of variables, which produce together a certain 
outcome. This methodology is also in line with path dependent model of politics, which is 
explained by Charles Ragin in his book The Comparative Method (1987). Variables are here 
assumed to have been built upon two fundamental concepts: endogeneity and interactions. 
Endogeneity refers to observation that ‘outcomes occur in sequences’ and that outcomes at a 
certain point in time could become a cause of another outcome at a later point (Coppedge, 
2012, pp.137). The other concept would refer to the interactions of these causes or outcomes 
that could produce another outcome. In other words, the point of the research is not to show 
the independent impact of each separate variable, but to observe the relationship between the 
variables of monetary power and international economic stability within two different 
monetary systems. Subsequently, the correlations within both case studies will be compared 
and could then arguably prove or disprove the hypothesis.  
 Nevertheless, there are a number of limitations inherent to this method of concomitant 
variations. It was in fact John Stuart Mill who argued at first that this method could not be 
applied in social sciences, because of the almost certainty that sufficiently similar cases could 
not be found (Lijphart, 1971). Although the chosen cases for this research are highly similar 
and the operationalization of the variables is limited in scope, the inherent drawback of this 
methodology remains that independent variables are not singled out as causal explanations. 
Moreover, the fact that the concept of monetary power is chosen as an independent variable is 
already an arbitrary decision or, better said, an informed guess. Even the operationalization of 
this concept is an informed but arbitrary list of likely causes based on the work of an author in 
the field. Other authors assign other causal variables than applied in this research 
(Kindleberger, 1973), while there is also the theoretical possibility that the literature leaves 
out relevant variables that could contribute to the eventual causation of the dependent 
variable, the stability of the international economic system. Lastly, although the methodology 
provides room for interactions of variables, there is no guarantee that this observed interaction 
always holds, or that an even more complicated set of variables causes the outcome. 
Especially considering the long time span within the case studies in this research, it is likely 
that highly complex interactions of variables could form a causal mechanism that is acting as 
a confounding variable. Still, despite these flaws this methodology is deemed highly useful in 
providing a strong comparative account for the small-N design of this research. It has also its 
merit, as the chosen cases could be considered rather similar, and the clear operationalization 
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of variables - and the connection between them – could provide a strong explanatory account 
for the research question, proving or disproving the hypothesis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The hypothesis to be tested 
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With the connection between monetary systems – and its impact on economic indicators - and 
stability established, the research will test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: The shift from the gold-exchange standard to the fiat currency standard has led to 
greater international economic instability  
 
The main reasons for the hypothesis’ claim that fiat currency standards lead to greater 
international economic instability than the gold-exchange standard – and not vice versa – is 
that the financial crisis of 2008 has sparked a renewed debate around the world – especially 
among the BRICS - about the underpinnings and stability of the design of our current 
international monetary system. Questions arose, such as: which factors have led to this 
financial turmoil, or what has been the role of the U.S. dollar as global currency reserve in the 
severity of this crisis?  
 As we have not seen such a large financial shock during the gold-exchange standard, it 
would be worthwhile to assume that the design fiat currency system has a greater 
destabilizing effect than its counterpart. Also, since the financial crisis of 2008 constituted the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression - according to the IMF- and central banks 
have been creating credit at unprecedented levels in history, it leads us to assume that the 
current international monetary design has contributed to greater economic instability (Stewart, 
2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bretton Woods gold-exchange standard (1944-1971) 
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Background 
When the Allied Forces were confident enough in 1944 that the War was drawing to a close 
in their favor, early rounds of negotiations and consultations were initiated between John M. 
Keynes of the British Treasury and Harry Dexter White, the representative of the Roosevelt 
Administration, about the post-war economic order (Steil, 2013). The subsequent successful 
formulation on April 21, 1944 of the so-called Joint Statement by Experts on the 
Establishment of an International Monetary Fund (Morgan, 1944) constituted for the United 
States ‘an important step toward international economic cooperation in the post-war world’ 
(United States. Department of State, 1944). Also, this statement arguably formed a significant 
building block that formed a trigger for the next steps in providing the necessary post-war 
financial and monetary architecture. Indeed, government documents reveal that President 
Roosevelt was keen on further international economic cooperation by means of a conference. 
These documents include the invitation to the conference in which the President articulates its 
purpose: ‘as a further step toward the realization of this objective the President of the United 
States now proposes to call a United Nations conference for the purpose of formulating 
proposals of a definite character for an international monetary fund and possibly a bank for 
reconstruction and development’ (United States. Department of State, 1944).  
 The overarching goal for the 44 delegates that took part in the conference was to 
design a representative international monetary system that would guarantee worldwide 
economic stability. The turbulent interwar period – with inter alia the Great Depression, the 
rise of protectionist policies and the banking panics of 1930 and early 1931 - had left its 
devastating marks on the world economy (Engemann, 2010).  This ‘never again- sentiment’ 
formed a key motivation to avoid a repeat of the chaotic past by forming a clever and stable 
design for the years ahead (James, 1996). Despite the presence of all the delegates the 
negotiations came down to a fierce debate between the representatives of the fading British 
Empire and the ‘newly born’ hegemon, the United States. Both ‘camps’ agreed on monetary 
stability as a disciplinary force and stressed the importance of multilateralism in international 
finance. However, while Harry Dexter White preferred an institutional structure that would 
‘discipline debtor countries more than creditors’ (Boughton, 2002, pp.20), Keynes wanted to 
have constraints on the creditors as well. Moreover, while White’s plan envisioned the 
creation of the IMF as the international lender of last resort, it was Keynes’ plan to establish 
an International Clearing Union, which would be based on international money, the so-called 
Bancor. Effectively, this Union would equal a global banking system where credit accounts of 
participants could be exchanged and used by other debtors (Steil, 2013). Nevertheless, despite 
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his design John Keynes knew that his bargaining position at the conference was rather weak. 
Already before the negotiations, Keynes seems to acknowledge the dim prospects for 
Britain’s role in the reshuffling of the cards in the post-war monetary system. The following 
excerpt is illustrative: 
 
“We shall end the war owing to all our friends and close associates far more money than we 
can pay. We are in no position, therefore, to set up as international bankers . . . unless we can 
secure a general settlement on the basis of temporary American assistance followed by an 
international scheme. [British freedom to engineer new postwar social and economic policies 
is] impossible without further American assistance . . . the Americans are strong enough to 
offer inducements to many or most of our friends to walk out on us, if we ostentatiously set out 
to start up an independent shop” (Steil, 2013, pp. 180).  
– Keynes to UK Chancellor John Anderson, during debate over the Joint Statement, February 
1944  
 
The war led to the inevitable decision of the British government to direct the Bank of England 
to open the money printing press to finance its military expenditures (Boughton, 2002). As a 
consequence, enormous debt levels caused Britain to be in an unfavorable position at the 
bargaining table. However, it was not necessarily the relatively ‘bad’ hand of cards of Britain, 
but rather the strong hand of the United States that gave the Roosevelt Administration the 
driver’s seat in the negotiations. The fact that White’s outmaneuvered Keynes with his 
proposal could be largely contributed to the powerful economic position of the United States 
at the end of the war. The United States was a trade surplus country, accounted for over half 
of the world’s manufacturing capacity and controlled more than two thirds of the world’s total 
gold reserves (Mason & Asher, 1973). It is thus no surprise that White successfully pushed 
for a ‘creditor favorable design’ in which the U.S. dollar and gold formed the backbone of the 
new system.  
 This new system is now commonly understood as the Bretton Woods gold-exchange 
standard. In its most simple form, in this system all currencies would be linked to the dollar, 
and this reserve currency would be convertible into gold at a fixed exchange rate of 35$ per 
ounce (Allen, 2005). In contrast to the classical gold standard, the currencies of central banks 
abroad were pegged to the dollar at specified parities, and not to bullion directly. Also it was 
no longer a legal requirement to exchange domestic banknotes with gold coins at the par 
value (Giovannini, 1988). In order to maintain relative exchange rate stability, an adjustable 
peg currency regime was created in which par values for foreign countries’ currencies were 
established. When so-called ‘fundamental disequilibria’ would occur, foreign central banks 
were allowed to intervene in the currency market, guaranteeing their currencies’ exchange 
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rate against the dollar. This adjustable peg system had an official margin of one per cent 
below or above parity, and was meant to tackle too heavy exchange rate fluctuations (Cohen, 
2008).  
 Especially at the end of WWII this exchange system proved to be an enormous 
advantage, as the huge expenses for the war caused central banks to have only limited 
amounts of gold reserves (Middelkoop, 2014). Now these central banks were given the 
guarantee by the United States that their exchanged dollars could be exchanged for gold on 
demand. This only applied to central banks, and not to the general public (Allen, 2005). 
Effectively, it meant for instance that the highly costly reconstruction efforts in Europe could 
be financed without the direct need to have the scarce physical gold bullion in the central 
banks’ reserves. Moreover, this gold exchange standard would considerably constrain the 
creation of an excessive money supply. If a country would supply too much money on the 
world market - so more money than actual gold reserves - it would risk gold drains and a loss 
of disproportionate amounts of its gold reserves. In theory, this constraining effect on the 
money supply of the global currency reserve would at least on the short term prevent global 
imbalances and guarantee healthy current accounts and trade balances (Mason & Asher, 
1973). Also, the fact that private sector and simple individuals did not have the right of 
conversion – such as during the classic gold standard in the late 19th century - meant that the 
monetary authorities could implement a more independent monetary policy (Giovannini, 
1988).  
 Another feature of the new postwar monetary architecture was the widespread use of 
restrictive measures to tackle speculative capital movements. Although these capital controls 
were at first envisaged to be a structural building block of the Bretton Woods System, an 
intervention by a powerful group of New York bankers led to its exclusion of the final 
agreement (Ghosh & Qureshi, 2016).  Article VI.3 of the IMF Articles of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement states “members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate 
international capital movements” (Ghosh & Qureshi, 2016, pp.16). This line thus does not 
imply the required use of capital controls, or states a requirement to enforce capital controls of 
other members of the agreement. Regardless of this technicality, there still was the 
widespread belief –notably among Keynes and White - that restrictive measures were 
necessary to combat a new wave of protectionist policies around the globe as the 1930s, 
which in their view was triggered by destabilizing and speculative capital flows (Ghosh & 
Qureshi, 2016). With the economic misery of the interwar period in mind it was agreed at the 
conference that that monetary autonomy was viewed more attractive than the more 
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unpredictable policy of free capital mobility. Both inflows and outflows were controlled, 
which included severe limitations on both speculation against currency pegs, and ‘foreign 
ownership of strategic industries’ (Ghosh & Qureshi, 2016, pp.4).  
 
U.S. monetary power in the period 1944-1971 
Before looking to the relationship between the described gold-exchange standard and 
international stability between 1944 and 1971 it is necessary to understand the nature of U.S. 
monetary power in this period. In order to analyze U.S. monetary power, Cohen (2005) 
provides an extensive account on this form of power and breaks down the concept into three 
highly interconnected sources: international liquidity (1), owned reserves (2) and borrowing 
capacity (3). These sources determine a state’s so-called power to delay, or ‘the capacity to 
avoid the burden of adjustment required by a payments imbalance’ (Cohen, 2008, pp.457). 
The inevitable link between national economies around the world through the balance of 
payments – the total net account of a country’s international trade and investment transactions 
- means that an unsustainable disequilibrium in a country’s external balance jeopardizes its 
independence in policymaking (Cohen, 2005). In other words, when an imbalance – for 
instance, a deficit - needs to be adjusted it is most attractive for a state to pass this buck on 
others as much as possible. In order to adjust their rather unhealthy imbalances, economies in 
deficit might be pressured to implement austerity packages, or devalue their currencies. These 
measures are often highly unpopular among the incumbent’s constituencies. It is therefore the 
extent to which countries can avoid or delay these economic and political costs that 
constitutes the very core of the concept of monetary power (Cohen, 2005).  
 Looking to the international liquidity position – the resources available to monetary 
authorities to cope with a balance of payments deficit - of the United States directly after 
WWII, it would be fair to characterize as very strong. The United States was a net creditor, 
the world was flooded with its currency, the Fed owned more than two thirds of the world’s 
stock of gold, and its strong economic and political position meant it became an attractive and 
safe place for trade and investment (Jackson, 2013). Although it was the sterling that was still 
the dominant world currency reserve in the late 1940s, it was the U.S. dollar by the end of the 
1950s that dominated global flows of trade and investment (Bordo & Eichengreen, 1993). In 
this time period foreign private creditors preferred the dollar to other currencies, whereas 
foreign monetary authorities preferred dollar holdings to gold reserves (Jackson, 2013). 
Moreover, while increasingly used as a unit of account to invoice imports and exports, the 
dollar also became the dominant medium of exchange for interbank transactions (Bordo & 
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Eichengreen, 1993). In other words, the means of the United States to settle potential 
imbalances in international payments in the post-WWII era were vast, while the rise of the 
dollar as key currency in the 50s and 60s seemed to guarantee a promising future of the U.S. 
monetary order.  
 However, despite earlier deficits in the U.S. balance of payments in the early 50s, the 
balance of payment deficits in the period 1958-1960 averaging $3,7 billion per year caused 
grave concern among U.S. policymakers. Still, it was not necessarily the deficit itself that was 
reason for concern for the Eisenhower administration and the Fed. Rather, it was the 
observation within this period – in the year 1959 - that the total amount of U.S. gold reserves 
were equalling external dollar liabilities, and that the world’s gold reserves surpassed the U.S. 
monetary gold stock for the first time after WWII (Bordo & Eichengreen, 1993) (see figure 
1). The deeper dynamic behind this balance of payments deficit was the seemingly inevitable 
growth of a liquidity problem and the connected confidence problem. This liquidity problem 
refers to the situation where the available sources of liquidity appear insufficient or 
inadequate to finance the growth of the worlds’ real output and the total trade output. In 1959 
it was evident that the world’s monetary gold stock lacked volume, the IMF lacked a powerful 
international currency for scenarios of last resort, and the relative and absolute gold shortage 
was unable to be continuously compensated by an increasing balance of payments deficit 
(Bordo & Eichengreen, 1993).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Monetary gold and dollar holdings, the US and the rest of the World, 1945-1971 (Bordo, 2014). 
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This balance of payments deficit was arguably fuelled by two main drivers: on the one hand 
post-war programs, such as the Marshall Plan, led to the printing and pumping of 
disproportionate –relative to the amount of gold reserves - amounts of U.S. dollars into the 
world economy. On the other, the high world demand for reserve currency-denominated 
bonds for foreign central banks’ liquidity purposes led to the attractive and quick process of 
raising capital but increasing deficits (Campanella, 2009). 
 Nevertheless, in October 1959 Yale University professor Robert Triffin provided an 
accredited statement in front of the Congress’ Joint Economic Committee on the 
incompatibility between providing world liquidity and the continuation of running these 
balance of payments deficits (Triffin, 1978). This incompatibility led him to argue for a strong 
reform of the international monetary system:  
 
"A fundamental reform of the international monetary system has long been overdue. Its 
necessity and urgency are further highlighted today by the imminent threat to the once mighty 
U.S. dollar." (Chance, 2010, pp. 105).  
- Robert Triffin about the structural flaws of the international monetary system  
 
The paradoxical essence of the problem was that if the Fed would continue to sell these 
popular dollar-denominated bonds, while having an absolute and relative decline of U.S. 
monetary gold reserves, it would bring the international monetary system on the verge of a 
convertibility crisis (Zoltan, 2013). The more U.S. dollars in circulation, while simultaneously 
a decreasing amount of the U.S. gold reserves, the more likely the reserve currency would be 
redeemed for gold. If this trend would continue, it would reach a turning point where the U.S. 
gold stock is at such a low level that there is no credible and sufficient guarantee that external 
dollar liabilities could be converted. The resulting convertibility and confidence crisis would 
reinforce each other in an endless spiral of instability, undermining the fundamentals of the 
Bretton Woods gold exchange standard (Bordo & Eichengreen, 1993). However, if the United 
States had stopped running balance of payment deficits in 1959, it would have resulted in a 
systemic worldwide shortage of the dollar as a reserve currency. The resulting liquidity crisis 
would most likely have severe negative deflationary effects on the world economy. When 
banks are severely short of liquidity they, inter alia, most likely cut back on lending, which 
negatively impacts savers, investors and businesses. Apart from bank run scenarios, this fall 
of investment levels leads to lower levels of economic growth and this worldwide economic 
contraction would hurt the United States economy as well. (Bordo & Eichengreen, 1993). 
Indeed, even if the United States would manage to restore its balance of payments deficits by 
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for instance reducing the amount of dollars in circulation and raising interest rates, these 
policy measures would most likely lead to a recession of its own economy (Ganziro & 
Vambery, 2016).   
 In other words, for the first time during the Bretton Woods gold-exchange standard the 
first cracks in the design became visible for both policymakers and international markets. 
Although this dilemma pointed to an undermining effect of U.S. monetary power on the long-
term, on the short term the United States remained capable to run balance of payment deficits 
and keep the show going. For this reason the United States postponed the foreseen negative 
ramifications of the Triffin dilemma by making holding dollars more attractive than a 
conversion to their gold reserves (Webb, 1995). This included the pressuring of its allied 
foreign monetary authorities not to convert their U.S. dollars into gold holdings, the 
establishment of a dense network of bilateral swap agreements with other central banks, and 
the issuing of so-called Roosa bonds by the U.S. Treasury (Bordo & Eichengreen, 1993).  
‘Roosa bonds’ are understood to be long-term nonmarketable bonds, purchased by foreign 
central banks or governments with U.S. dollars, but redeemed and repaid in foreign 
currencies, such as the Swiss Franc or Italian Lira (Bordo, Humpage & Schwartz, 2015). 
Because these bonds were free of an exchange rate risk – such as a devaluation of the U.S. 
dollar  - it guaranteed the bond’s value for foreign central banks, and diminished their 
incentive to purchase U.S. gold reserves (Makin, 1971).  
 Although these measures seemed to work on the short-term, criticism mounted from 
Europe on the monetary policies from the United States. Mid 1960s it were especially France 
and Germany, which were increasingly less willing to absorb the balance of payments deficits 
of the United States (Webb, 1995).  They believed that due to seigniorage advantage – the 
vast difference between the accepted value of the issued dollar and its production costs – the 
U.S. earned on its liabilities.  Whereas the production costs of a $100 bill were not even a 
penny for the Fed, for foreign central banks this bill actually cost $100 in actual goods and 
services. This allowed the United States to run large deficits and pay for, inter alia, its costly 
Vietnam War and government programs, such as Johnson’s Great Society (Bordo & 
Eichengreen, 1993). While the inflation-averse West-German government criticized the 
United States for exporting inflation to surplus countries, the French finance minister Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing called this system of disproportionately running balance of payments 
deficits for its own interests an ‘exorbitant privilege’ (Bernanke, 2016). In fact, in February 
1965 the French government actively launched a campaign against the dollar, in which 
outstanding dollar liabilities were converted into actual gold.  By simultaneously doubling the 
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price of gold, it would make great capital gains at the expense of the confidence of the dollar 
as the global currency reserve and its credibility of convertibility (Bordo, 1999). This trend of 
unsatisfied countries redeeming their gold reserves, and the growing balance of payments 
deficits were related to two structural destabilizing forces: a growing gold scarcity and a rise 
in U.S. inflation. Despite – quite technical – proposals to tackle these forces, such as the 
introduction of a (basket) of new world reserve asset, efforts to double the Fed’s price of gold 
and the demonetization of gold, the Nixon administration gradually faced the implications as 
foreseen by Robert Triffin. This unsustainable and uncontrollable monetary situation 
eventually led to the Nixon Shock in 1971; the point in time when, simply put, the Nixon 
administration suspended the convertibility of U.S. dollars into gold or other reserve assets 
(Bordo & Eichengreen, 1993).  
 
The Bretton Woods gold-exchange standard and volatility in exchange rates 
Of all the IMF indicators that determine international economic stability, the indicator of 
reducing the excessive volatility of exchange rates was most clearly articulated by the 
designers of the Bretton Woods Agreement. As mentioned in the previous section, in order to 
prevent the repetition of currency and trade wars of the 1930s, the designers established the 
IMF Articles measures to, inter alia, ensure stable exchange rates, limit inflation and 
guarantee a prosperous post-WWII reconstruction period (Adam, Subacchi & Vines, 2012). 
Looking to figure 2 it is evident that exchange rates of the major global currencies have been 
rather stable during the Bretton Woods gold-exchange standard (1944-1971).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Pound, Yen, Deutschmark and French Franc against the Dollar 1945-1975 (Winton, 2015a). 
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Indeed, when taking into account that strictly speaking the Bretton Woods System only 
became fully operational in 1958; the year when exchange controls for current account 
transactions were eliminated, we can observe an even higher level of exchange rate stability 
in the period 1958-1971 (Hetzel, 2013). In other words, as long as the initial capital controls, 
the adjustable peg currency regime and the U.S. gold convertibility promise were in place, 
this monetary system seemed to guarantee a significant level of stability in the exchange rate 
dimension. It is thus also not surprising that the exchange rates slightly start floating again in 
the year 1973 when a floating exchange rate system with the U.S. dollar as lynchpin replaced 
the Bretton Woods System.  
  
The Bretton Woods gold-exchange standard and inflation levels 
Another goal of the Bretton Woods design was a low and stable level of inflation, which is 
commonly assumed to positively correlate with (international) economic stability. Historically 
speaking, gold standards tend to provide long-term price stability, in which inflation is kept at 
a minimum. The reasoning behind low inflation, or price stability in a gold (exchange) 
standard is that the monetary constraints on the member’s money supply and credit – which is 
dependent on the amount of gold reserves – most likely leads to lower levels of excessive 
spending than for instance a fiat currency standard (Bordo, Dittmar & Gavin, 2003). Such a 
commodity standards limits, in principle, a state’s inflationary and deflationary abilities. 
Moreover, as the exchange rates were fixed during the gold exchange standard it was mainly 
the holder of global currency reserve that caused simultaneous price level changes around the 
world (Bordo & Humpage, 2015).  
 When looking to the inflation levels of the Bretton Woods System period both the 
CRB commodity index and the CPI-U index could provide more insight. Although these 
indexes refer to inflation levels in the United States, they could still provide an indication –
given the vast impact of the United States on the international economic system with its 
global currency reserve - about the dynamics in the world in general. The former index serves 
since 1959 as a representative indicator for current and anticipated volatility in global 
commodity markets. It comprises a basket of 19 commodities, including crude oil (23%), 
natural gas (6%), gold (6%), live cattle (6%), aluminium (6%), soy beans (6%), corn (6%), 
copper (6%), unleaded gas (5%), sugar (5%), heating oil (5%), cocoa (5%), coffee (5%), 
cotton (5%), lean hogs (1%), nickel (1%), orange juice (1%), silver (1%), wheat (1%) 
(Cabrales, Castro & Joya, 2014). A price index of commodity markets is a powerful indicator 
for anticipated inflation, as it responds quickly to global economic shocks or fluctuations in 
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demand and supply (Furlong & Ingenito, 1996). Significant examples would be the oil crisis 
of 1973 following American involvement in the Yom Kippur War, and the oil shock of 1979 
after the Iranian revolution. Both events – a sudden drop in the supply of oil - led to a rather 
volatile fluctuation in the CRB commodity index, as can be seen in figure 3. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  A historical overview of the CBR index, years 1749-2011 (Lewis, 2016a).  
Another powerful indicator is the CPI-U index, which measures the general consumer price 
inflation. It calculates the relative prices of all goods and services that are paid by households 
on a monthly basis. One could thus measure possible inflationary or deflationary trends by 
tracking prices changes within a specific time period. All expenditure items are classified into 
more than two hundred categories, which in turn are clustered into eight major groups (BLS, 
2017). These groups include: food and beverages (1), housing (2), apparel (3), transportation 
(4), medical care (5), recreation (6), education and communication (7), and other goods and 
services (8).    
 When we combine both indexes in a graph (see figure 4) we can observe the 
fluctuation in inflation levels during the Bretton Woods System. One of the first things that 
could be observed is the different extent of volatility of both indexes. A CRB commodity 
index has naturally the characteristic to have a higher volatility (read: a higher standard 
deviation) than a CPI index, especially when economic shocks occur that have a significant 
impact on the demand or supply of a commodity, such as oil. In contrast to the CRB basket, 
the CPI-U captures all goods and services. Effectively, this means that there is a relatively 
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higher moderating effect of other goods and services; so when a high volatility occurs in the 
price level of one good or service it has less impact on the CPI-U index as a whole than would 
occur in the CRB index basket (BLS, 2017). We can observe this in figure 4, where the blue 
line (CRB index) deviates significantly more than the red line (the CPI-U index).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. U.S.: Reuters/CRB Commodity Index and CPI-U (Lewis, 2016b) 
 
Thus when strictly looking to the time period between 1944 and 1971 in both figure 3 and 
figure 4 - the moment when the Bretton Woods gold exchange standard was agreed upon until 
the Nixon Shock in 1971 - both indexes show a relatively constant level of inflation, without 
excessive fluctuation.  
 Nevertheless, there seems to be two periods that are an exception to this trend of 
stability. The first exception refers to the level of inflation of the early post-WWI years, so the 
years 1946, 1947 and 1948. Specifically, data of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
shows that the average annual change of the CPI-U index was 8,3%, 14,4% and 8,1 % 
respectively. Compared to the average of 3,19% between 1944 and 1971, these numbers could 
be seen as rather high (BLS, 2017).  However, these high inflation numbers could mostly be 
attributed to the lifting of wage and price controls by the end of 1946, specifically the lifting 
of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 (Grainey, 1943, pp. 32). The inflation that was 
already accomplished during the WWII materialized in these three years, which contributed to 
the high levels of inflation in this time period. The other minor exception to the stable 
inflation trend refers to the last couple of years before the actual Nixon shock, so the years 
1968, 1969 and 1970. According to the BLS the average annual change of the CPI-U index in 
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these years corresponded with 4,2%, 5,5% and 5,7%. Although the standard deviation is not 
as high as the post-war years, it shows a slight increase compared to the years before. It was 
mainly President Johnson’s spending on the Vietnam War and the Great Society that arguably 
took its toll on both the balance of payments deficit and inflation rates in the very last years of 
the Bretton Woods System (D’Arista, 2009). Also, it should be noted that in this time period 
capital controls in both the United States and European markets were gradually eased off; a 
process that had already started in the early 1960s (Ghosh & Qureshi, 2016). This is a relevant 
process to note, as the easing of capital controls is widely seen as a complicating factor for 
governments to keep their domestic inflation under control (Davis, & Presno, 2014).  
 
The Bretton Woods gold-exchange standard and large swings in economic activity 
When looking to the other two IMF indicators defining international economic (in-) stability – 
the amount of financial crises and large swings in economic activity – it is evident these two 
factors are heavily interlinked, and are part of what is understood as a business cycle of a 
state’s economy. The possibly most quoted and widely used definition of a business cycle is 
of Burns and Mitchell (1946) who provide the following definition: 
 
“Business cycles are a type of fluctuation found in the aggregate economic activity of nations 
that organize their work mainly in business enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions 
occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, followed by similarly general 
recessions, contractions, and revivals which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle; 
the sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic; in duration cycles vary from more than 
one year to ten or twelve years; they are not divisible into shorter cycles of similar character 
with amplitudes approximating their own” (Burns & Mtchell, 1946, pp.1).  
 
Within these business cycles financial crises – often triggered by shocks in the financial 
markets – are the tipping point that terminates the (speculative) boom, leading into a recession 
(Povel, Singh & Winton, 2007). A common characteristic of these business cycles is that it 
assumes a fluctuation in economic activity in a state’s economy by pointing to recurrent 
expansionary and contractionary phases. Without specifying any regularity in the periodicity, 
or the extent of contractionary/expansionary phases, this definition thus provides us the 
understanding that swings in economic activity are cyclical. In order to provide meaning to 
the IMF indicator of a financial crisis we thus assume all ‘financial crises’ during the Bretton 
Woods System, which have evolved into a global recession and thus led to a significant 
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contraction or expansion of economic activity (IMF, 2002). Therefore, for the sake of analysis 
we define a recession when there is a negative real GDP growth for a period longer than 6 
months, whereas expansion refers to a positive growth for the same time period or more 
(IMF, 2002). When applying this definition to the period of the Bretton Woods System, six 
recessions could be dissected: the recessions in the years 1945, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1960 and 
1970 (Amadeo, 2017). However, it should be noted at first that direct causality between the 
gold-exchange standard and these recessions is beyond our analytical framework. Analysts 
attribute a variety of causes to these recessions: The 1945 recession is, for instance, allegedly 
caused by the demobilization from WWII and a huge drop in government spending, while the 
recessions in 1949 and 1957 are arguably caused by monetary tightening policies of the Fed 
(Amadeo, 2017). Moreover, it should be stressed that recessions purely refer to contractionary 
periods, and not to financial crises with the extent of 2008 or the period of contraction after 
1929. Nevertheless, regardless of the causes some general observations can be made about the 
extent of these recessions. When looking to these recessions during the Bretton Woods 
System 1950-1972) it becomes clear, for instance, that compared to the prewar and interwar 
periods the average decline seems to be relatively small (-2,1%), while the average increase in 
output during expansionary phases is relatively high (102,9%). 
 
 
 
When providing meaning to the concept of financial crises within a business cycle  
 
 
 
When providing m 
 
Looking to the two IMF indicators for determining international economic stability – ‘amount 
of financial crises’ and ‘large swings in economic activity’ – it is therefore 
 
Figure 5: IMF Staff Calculations on Recession and Expansions: 1881-2000 (IMF, 2002, pp.108).  
 
 Another interesting observation is that the amount of 1-year recessions is higher than 
previous periods, while the amount of two-year recessions is significantly lower. Indeed, three 
year-recessions have not even been recorded during the Bretton Woods System. In short, it 
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can thus be said that during this period no systemic financial crisis has been recorded, the 
recessions were brief and relatively marginal in terms of decline in output, whereas periods of 
expansions were considerable larger than the previous and subsequent monetary systems in 
the figure. Although the IMF indicator ‘large swings in economic activity’ remains subjective, 
it can safely be said that no disproportionate fluctuations in economic output can be observed 
during the Bretton Woods system. Given the multidimensionality and causal psychological 
and economic complexity of financial crises, there is no conclusive link however between the 
design of the monetary system itself, and the volatility of economic output, and amount of 
recessions (IMF, 2013). Still, it is evident that the design has had at least on the short term a 
constraining effect on high fluctuations in economic activity. This design includes, inter alia, 
restrictive measures or capital controls, the fixed exchange rates system, the constrain on the 
money supply by means of the gold exchange standard, and the IMF as lender of last resort in 
turbulent economic times.  
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The fiat currency standard (1971- now) 
Background 
By the early 1970s it became clear for the Nixon administration that the dollar-centered 
Bretton Woods System as envisaged in 1944 became unsustainable. The widening balance of 
payments deficit, the dollar’s overvaluation, increasingly frequent periodic runs on the dollar 
and active policies of foreign governments to convert their dollar holdings, were factors that 
contributed to an uncontrollable situation. These factors not only undermined the United 
States’ foreign trading position, but also the very fundamentals the Bretton Woods System 
was based on: the promise of U.S. dollar convertibility into gold at a fixed price of 35$ per 
ounce (Irwin, 2013).  It led President Nixon to give a public television speech on August 15, 
1971, addressing the American people on ‘the challenge of peace’. In this speech he identified 
three fronts that required government action in order to ensure a stable ‘post-Vietnam world’:  
 
“Prosperity without war requires action on three fronts: We must create more and better 
jobs; we must stop the rise in the cost of living; we must protect the dollar from the attacks of 
international money speculators” (Peters & Woolley, 2017).  
- President Richard Nixon and his ‘Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: 
“The Challenge of Peace”, August 1971 
 
In order to address the first two fronts, Nixon issued Executive Order 11615 with the aim of 
stabilizing the economy, reducing inflation, and minimizing unemployment. This Order 
included wage and price controls for 90 days for the first time since WWII. Moreover, for the 
first time since the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 Nixon implemented a 10% increase of a 
structural import tariff on about 52% of U.S. imports (Irwin, 2013). The reasoning behind this 
import surcharge was to both counter negative effects of an expected increase in volatility of 
exchange rates on American products, and to pressure its trading partners to revalue their 
currencies against the dollar (Irwin, 2013). It was the third front however that forced him to 
implement the most radical measure of all: to abandon the system of par values and end the 
convertibility of U.S. dollars into gold (Vries, 1976). Four months after this package of 
economic measures – now widely known as the Nixon Shock – Ministers and/or Central Bank 
Governors of the G10 gathered for a meeting at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, D.C. 
with the aim of renegotiating the exchange rate parities (Irwin, 2013). The representatives 
agreed on a devaluation of the dollar (8,5%) against gold that would lead to a gold price of 
$38 per ounce, while foreign key currencies would revalue and appreciate their currencies in 
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terms of the dollar. The overall net effect of this agreement proved to be an average of a 
10,7% dollar devaluation relative to the other G10-currencies in the exchange rate system 
(Vries, 1976). Moreover, as part of the agreement the above mentioned import surcharge was 
lifted by means of an executive order of Nixon. However, despite these efforts to save the 
fixed exchange rate system gold prices soared in the early 1970s to 90$ per ounce, and 
speculative pressure against the U.S. dollar continued (Humpage, 2013). As a consequence of 
the waning confidence and pressure on the dollar in the financial markets, it led to the 
decision by the Japanese central blank to let the Yen float against the dollar. Indeed, when the 
European Community followed suit in March 1973 by dropping their peg to the dollar and 
thus by effectively jointly floating against the U.S. dollar, it meant the final deathblow to the 
remnants of the Bretton Woods System (Vries, 1976). In that month the Bretton Woods 
System was effectively transformed into a floating exchange rate system where the dollar 
would serve as its lynchpin.  
 Within this system the dollar then took up the role of ‘fiat money’, providing the 
floating exchange system a ‘new’ anchor. The term fiat money or fiduciary money has its 
roots in the third verse of the book of Genesis; referring to the first words that God spoke - 
according to the story - when he created heaven and earth: ‘fiat lux’ in Latin or ‘let there be 
light’ in English (Middelkoop, 2014). When the floating exchange rate system was in place by 
March 1973, it effectively meant that the value of every dollar in one’s savings, holdings or 
portfolio would be determined by the amount of global confidence and trust in this medium of 
exchange. In other words, without any commodity backing every newly printed dollar by the 
Fed would be created ‘out of thin air’, just as heaven and earth were created out of nothing in 
the biblical verse (Hermele, 2013). In contrast to the carefully designed Bretton Woods 
System this fiat currency system is thus not necessarily designed, but rather the result of an 
incremental process where the Bretton Woods fundamentals have been removed.  
 
U.S. monetary power in the period 1971 - present 
When looking to the variables of Cohen (2005) that are determining America’s power to 
delay and its overall monetary power in this period, it is evident that the U.S. dollar in its role 
as global currency reserve has had a vast impact on these forms of power. Although the peg to 
the U.S. dollar was removed in March 1973, the dollar remained the most widely 
internationalized currency in the world economy. Despite an insecure outlook on how the 
floating exchange system would impact the role of the dollar, the dollar eventually even 
reinforced its position in the world markets. In this newly evolved monetary system the dollar 
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remained the world’s most dominant currency in terms of circulation and use by both private 
and public entities. Its dominant use could be broken down in the three main roles generally 
performed by money: a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value (Kirshner, 
2003). First, the dollar has been the most dominant medium of exchange to facilitate 
(international) transactions since the early 1950s. For private entities it meant that most of 
their transactions were settled in U.S. dollars, while for public entities – foreign central banks 
and government – it meant that the dollar was the dominant currency in their foreign 
exchange reserves (Chey, 2012). Figure 6, demonstrates the currency composition of the 
globally disclosed reserves since 1945 (so excluding the significant Chinese Renminbi), and 
indicates a decrease of the dollar as exchange reserve between 1962 and 1971. However, after 
1973 one could clearly observe in the figure an increase of both dollars and eurodollars – U.S. 
dollar-denominated deposits that are held outside the United States, mostly in Europe - as 
global foreign exchange reserves. This trend reaches a peak with 70% of the foreign exchange 
reserves in the period 1973-1975 before it stabilizes with 60% on the long term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6: Currency composition of globally disclosed foreign exchange reserves at constant exchange 
 rates (1947-2012, %) (Eichengreen, Chitu & Mehl, 2014, pp. 26) 
As the dollar became increasingly used as a medium of exchange for international 
transactions and reserves, it also signifies that the dollar increasingly performed the role of the 
unit of account – a standardized monetary unit – and the role of a store of value. By 
performing these three roles of money on a global scale, it meant that after 1973 the dollar 
continued to play the global currency reserve in the new fiat currency system (Chey, 2012). 
By Alexander Smeets  s1241583 
 38 
The fact that the U.S. dollar remained the dominant reserve currency was arguably because of 
the incumbent advantages attached to the widely internationalised character of the dollar 
during the Bretton Woods System. There was no other powerful state issuing a credible 
alternative for the incumbent reserve currency, network externalities were at play – so stocks, 
bonds, reserves and investor’s portfolio’s were already vastly embedded in a dollar system – 
giving a gravitational pull to the incumbent currency (Norrlof, 2014), and the dollar still had a 
sufficiently credible reputation that guaranteed global confidence in this currency as a store of 
value (Chey, 2012). An additional factor that arguably enhanced the global use and 
confidence in the dollar – especially after the devastating oil crisis of 1973 - was the 
negotiated petrodollar system in July 1974 with Saudi Arabia. In return for a commitment to 
protect Saudi Arabia against adversaries in the region and an enhanced defence cooperation – 
Saudi Arabia is currently the U.S.’ largest importer of defence equipment – the Kingdom 
would sell their oil into dollars, which they would invest in U.S. treasuries and other 
government debt securities (Wong, 2016). This system would not only increase global 
demand for dollars and treasuries, it would also give the opportunity – provided the 
confidence in the fiat currency system – for the U.S. government to purchase Saudi oil with 
its own created money. This system effectively underpinned the dollar’s role as global 
currency reserve and has helped financing the trade deficit of the U.S. (Wong, 2016).  
 The inherent power ánd weakness of having this global currency reserve is that the 
issuer and provider of this currency – the United States – has an enormous power to delay, the 
core of monetary power. In contrast to the Bretton Woods System where the amount of gold 
reserves still served as an external limit on money and credit creation, the fiat currency system 
has – as long as confidence is guaranteed in the dollar - no built-in variable that constrains the 
U.S. monetary capability to finance (trade-) deficits with printed money of the Fed. The 
removal of this limit could evidently be seen in the increase of fluctuation – after the de facto 
birth of the fiat currency system in 1973 - of some key currency holder’s current accounts, the 
broadest measure of the net flow of trade and investment income. In order to illustrate this 
increase, we compare the current account of the United States (figure 7) with two other global 
key currency holders: Germany (figure 8) and the United Kingdom (figure 9). When taking 
these figures together, we could observe two evident patterns after the ‘creation’ of the fiat 
currency system in 1973: not only has the fluctuation of their respective current accounts 
slightly increased after 1973, but this fluctuation has also drastically intensified during this 
system’s overall lifespan. Although the absolute numbers on the y-axis differ for all figures –
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Germany is now, for instance, experiencing a positive current account in contrast to the U.S. 
and the U.K. – the intensity of fluctuation seems to follow the same pattern.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The U.S. Current Account (Tradingeconomics, 2017a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Germany Current Account (Tradingeconomics, 2017b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: United Kingdom Current Account (Tradingeconomics, 2017c). 
So what could explain this increase in fluctuation after the birth of the fiat currency system 
after March 1973? Three factors could be dissected that arguably have had a positive effect on 
the observed pattern of fluctuation.  
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 First, a contributing factor to this increase of volatility could be attributed to the 
United States’ ability to expand its current account deficit with its own printed money – an 
ability, which was already an ‘exorbitant privilege’ during the gold exchange standard, 
according to Giscard d’Estaing. However, the difference is that under the fiat currency system 
there is no commodity or promise of convertibility that limit the Fed’s ability to create credit. 
With global trust and confidence grounded in the U.S. dollar, the U.S. could thus increasingly 
finance its deficits with its own money and thus effectively export its currency to the world 
market. As long as the rest of the world seems willing to acquire dollar assets, the U.S. can 
theoretically run limitless current account deficits. Although this factor does not necessarily 
entail a causal relationship with a current account deficit, it is noteworthy that this fiat 
currency system removed the above-mentioned limiting disincentive – which was in place 
under the gold standard - to run current account deficits.  
 Second, under the fiat currency system a floating exchange rate regime came into full 
operation, which allowed major currencies to float against each other. Without a commodity 
anchor or an adjustable peg system – as under the gold exchange standard – this system 
inherently laid the basis for a track of higher exchange rate volatility and speculation. The 
connection between exchange rate volatility and a higher trade deficit could clearly be 
observed with the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, where the collapse of the Thai baht 
sparked a currency crisis – evolving in a subsequent financial crisis - in South-East Asia 
(Miller & Luangaram, 1998). While currency devaluations spread throughout East-Asia, it not 
only led to loss of purchasing power to buy products on the U.S. market, but it simultaneously 
led to a significantly higher U.S. demand for Asian products. Moreover, whereas an 
increasing capital inflow could be recorded to the affected East-Asian countries (Philippines, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Korea and South Korea) with almost $100 billion in 1996, in 1997 this 
turned into a $12 billion outflow (Grenville, 1998). As a consequence of this reversal, these 
devaluations boosted the relative exchange value of the U.S. dollar, while the dollar also 
appreciated because liquid capital sought a safe store of value, which was, inter alia, the dollar 
at the time. In other words, this high exchange rate value of the dollar thus contributed to a 
significant increase in the U.S. current account deficit (see figure 7) - a situation where the 
demand for relatively cheap foreign products vastly exceeded the foreign demand for 
expensive American products (Miller & Luangaram, 1998). 
 Third, closely connected to the floating exchange rate regime during the fiat currency 
system is the gradually lifting of capital controls during the 70s and 80s. Especially during the 
80s the Reagan-Thatcher free market doctrine has led to a significant liberalization of capital 
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controls. This trend of reducing capital controls has persisted until the financial crisis of 2008 
when doubts arose about the management of international (private) capital flows- and their 
ramifications - in the global financial architecture (Grabel & Gallagher, 2015). Indeed, the 
Trump administration has publicly stated in March 2017 to impose ‘a massive border tax’ on 
imports and implement restrictions on foreign transactions of American businesses (Garret, 
2017). Despite the conception that the lifting of capital controls could be associated with 
economic growth in terms of GDP, increase of investments and a reduction of capital costs, 
the Asia financial crisis has demonstrated that sudden capital shocks could contribute to an 
unwanted dollar appreciation and a trade deficit (Miller & Luangaram, 1998). It should be 
noted that capital controls have also been eased under the gold exchange standard in the 60s, 
but the ramifications on the current account could be considered marginal (see figure 7). The 
scope of the lifting of capital controls was then narrow – compared to the 80s – while both the 
adjustable peg currency regime and the fixed commodity anchor acted as stabilizing forces on 
the U.S. current account.  
 Nevertheless, these fluctuations of the U.S. current account deficit are not inherently 
bad for a state’s economy. On the contrary, when the payoff of a state’s investments - 
financed by external debt - is higher than the total costs for the debt’s interest rate, it could 
have a positive effect on its budget and economy. Indeed, in times of recession it is argued by 
economists that deficit spending could reboot a state’s economy and lead to an overall higher 
return than the interest rates expenses (Middelkoop, 2014). However, when the U.S. current 
account and budget deficit – which follow the same pattern, and when looking to figure 7 and 
figure 10 they are assumed to be positively correlated – have a structural character they could 
have a destabilizing effect on U.S. monetary power. ‘Structural’ points in this sense to an 
accumulation of federal budget deficits, leading to a high federal debt. Since the start of the 
fiat currency system in March 1973, figure 10 demonstrates that not only the volatility of the 
budget deficit/surplus has dramatically increased, but – especially compared to the gold 
exchange standard – that the average level of the budget deficit has significantly increased as 
well. These budget deficits together with other significant causes, such as the borrowing of 
the Social Security Trust Fund and the total stock of treasury bonds held by China and Japan, 
have eventually led to the current national debt level of $19.900 billion, an equivalent of 
$61.200 per U.S. citizen (see figure 11). (Taylor, Proaño, Carvalho & Barbosa, 2012). The 
amount of debt has thus grown exponentially under the fiat currency standard and this trend is 
likely to continue. Again, having a significant amount of debt does not necessarily have a 
negative impact on an economy’s real growth or monetary power. However, an 
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‘unsustainable’ amount of debt could lead to a decline in confidence in the U.S. dollar – the 
core of the fiat currency system - among global investors and lenders.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Federal Surplus or Deficit (FRED, 2017a). 
 When it gets harder for the United States to acquire a low interest rate from lenders, it 
could be an indication that lenders are getting concerned about the U.S. solvency and their 
ability to repay the bond. When lenders in turn calculate their increased risk in a higher 
interest rate, it will get more expensive for the U.S. to finance its debt, reducing its borrowing 
capacity (Pollin, 2012). In theory, this spiral could lead to a sovereign debt crisis, which has 
happened in Europe with the European sovereign debt crisis since the end of 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Federal Debt: Total Public Debt (FRED, 2017b). 
 The question naturally arises: what is an unsustainable amount of debt? Although this 
question is subject to discussion the World Bank, for instance, applies a threshold of 77% 
(debt-GDP ratio) as a tipping point when an increasing amount of debt comes at the expense 
of annual real growth and enhances the risk of a sovereign debt crisis (World Bank, 2008). 
Others contend that a 100% debt-GDP ratio should be taken as a critical threshold. In both 
cases the current U.S. debt-GDP ratio of 104,19% would be unsustainable. In any case, 
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without regard to these subjective measures – Japan, for instance, has a GDP-debt ratio of 
250,4% - the significant amount of debt that has been built up under the fiat currency system 
has led to an additional risk for U.S. policymakers. If the foundation of the fiat currency 
system –confidence – declines there is an enhanced risk of a downward spiral in which global 
investors and central banks sell their U.S. debt and dollar assets, which could lead to 
hyperinflation in the United States and negatively affects its power to delay (Rickards, 2014). 
 Another relevant function of the power to delay under the fiat currency system has 
been the implementation of Quantitative Easing (QE) in the wake of the global financial crisis 
of 2008. Between November 2008 and October 2014 three rounds of QE (QE1, QE2 & QE3) 
have been implemented where the Fed accumulated around $4,5 trillion in assets, mainly 
consisting of government bonds and mortgage-backed securities (Sinclair & Ellis, 2012). 
With this program the Fed injected liquidity into the capital markets by buying bank’s bonds 
and securities with the goal of lowering interest rates and boosting economic growth. In 
theory, the program allowed commercial banks to have more reserves – accumulated by 
selling their bonds or securities to the Fed via QE – which provided a more conducive balance 
sheet to lower their interest rates and strengthen their willingness to lend money to a 
collapsing economy.  
 According to some this de facto credit creation program - where money is printed out 
of thin air to finance the mentioned bonds and securities – has prevented a deflationary spiral 
where the recession could have slid into a deep depression. The psychological effect of the 
determined behavior of the Fed to stimulate the economy arguably enhanced the level of 
confidence among commercial banks, businesses and investors in the U.S. economy (Sinclair 
& Ellis, 2012).  Others have countered that the long-term impact of QE – and thus an 
immense amount of dollars in circulation – could bounce back in the form of long-term 
(hyper-) inflation. Moreover, they argue that this enormous credit creation has contributed to 
a liquidity-driven system of booms and busts in asset prices (End, 2015). The program is also 
criticized for the psychological process of moral hazard, a situation when bonds are bought on 
too favorable terms by the Fed, leading to a lower threshold to provide loans to less 
‘qualified’ borrowers. The moment the rounds of QE are stalled for too long however, this 
boom is halted as bank’s reserves tighten and call in their loans. In this scenario QE has 
turned into a drug that increasingly needs to be given to the patient – there are rumors for QE4 
under the Trump administration (Diaz, 2017) - and has arguably led to a higher fluctuation of 
business cycles (Sinclair & Ellis, 2012). Regardless of the effects of QE, it should be noted 
that the design of the fiat currency system – with the dollar as the global currency reserve – 
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allowed the existence of the QE-program in the first place. With a gold exchange standard and 
the promise of convertibility at a fixed rate it would have been impossible for the Fed to 
credibly implement the size of this program. It would most likely have led to an excessive 
worldwide demand for gold conversion, undermining the core of the gold-exchange system. 
Indeed, if the gold-exchange standard would be in place today it would cost roughly $26.000 
per ounce of gold to cover the current currency supply; a significant difference with the $35 
per ounce during the Bretton Woods System (Rickards, 2014). In contrast, a fiat currency 
system perfectly allows this program as long as there is worldwide trust and confidence in the 
U.S. dollar as global currency reserve.  
 What the current account deficit, budget deficit, public debt and the rounds of QE have 
in common is that all these variables are grounded in global confidence in the U.S. dollar as 
global currency reserve, and the world’s willingness to accumulate these dollar assets. In 
other words, compared to the gold-exchange standard the U.S. power to delay has gained 
considerable strength with the design of the fiat currency system. Undoubtedly, limited capital 
controls, no promise of gold convertibility and global confidence in the U.S. dollar as 
currency reserve have contributed to an increase in monetary flexibility for the U.S. 
government to delay the financial burden of its balance of payment, budget/current account 
deficits and public debt. However, the inherent danger of this system is that this rather strong 
power to delay could bounce back when its psychological foundation – confidence – is 
slightly undermined. Confidence (in the U.S. dollar) in itself is hard to grasp or measure, and 
any unexpected catalyst or trigger - such as a large-scale war, financial warfare, a sovereign 
debt crisis or a massive sale of U.S. treasury bonds by China - could theoretically undermine 
its base, leading to a worldwide dollar run. Although this would be the most destructive and 
extreme scenario - which could both be triggered by a decline of confidence and 
simultaneously be a cause of waning confidence – ongoing global trends could be observed in 
which the dollar is increasingly bypassed as a means of exchange for global trade and 
investment, undermining the confidence in the dollar as global currency reserve.  
 
Global pressures on the U.S. dollar as a means of exchange  
A specific subsection is here included about current trends that have a destabilizing effect on 
the global confidence in the U.S. dollar. It is significant to note as confidence is the core of 
the fiat currency system, and when this is lost the international monetary system disintegrates. 
Especially the global financial crisis of 2008 seemed to have had an accelerating effect on 
bypassing the U.S. dollar in global trade and investment.  
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 The first notable trend that could be observed after 2008 is the explosion of reciprocal 
and non-reciprocal bilateral swap agreements (BSA) between central banks around the world. 
Central banks noticed the successful use of the liquidity agreements between the Fed and the 
ECB as a lender of last resort to the financial crisis. As a result, more than 50 countries 
launched the process of signing BSA’s, which has led to the development of dense liquidity 
networks. China alone has negotiated a total of 32 BSA’s in the time period 2009-2015, 
compared to zero in the period before the financial crisis (Yihong, 2015). Indeed, the 
worldwide shortage of U.S. dollars in the wake of the financial crisis exposed the risks of a 
dollar dependent balance sheet, especially for the Beijing authorities that were - de facto - 
forced to purchase enormous amounts of U.S. treasury bonds so the U.S. government could 
finance global debts (Kwon, 2015). A parallel large liquidity network could thus provide an 
additional stabilizing mechanism for a country’s balance of payments or the global financial 
system in times of panic (McDowell, 2017). Moreover, having the capacity to activate a 
network of liquidity agreements provides central banks an additional tool to manage the value 
of its exchange rate, especially during a financial crisis. Most of these BSA’s are denominated 
in local currencies – bypassing the U.S. dollar - which are swapped to facilitate cross-border 
trade and investment. Russia and China are, for instance, increasingly intensifying local 
currency cooperation and expanding its renminbi-ruble trade platform for investment 
purposes (‘Yuan Clearing Bank Opens in Moscow as Russia, China Dump Dollar in Bilateral 
Trade’, 2017). This bypassing of the U.S. dollar could also be seen in bilateral trade 
(ruble/renminbi) deals between the Kremlin and Beijing, such as a 30-year, $400 billion deal 
in 2014, in which Gazprom will deliver gas to China (Luhn & Macalister, 2014).  
 The second trend is the internationalization of the Chinese renminbi, and the 
promotion of Beijing to use the renminbi in global transactions. Apart from the above-
mentioned BSA’s and trade agreements, it also includes opening up offshore channels for 
foreign investors to China’s bond and equity market. An example is the Renminbi Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) program where foreign investors could invest – 
provided certain conditions and quota – in the renminbi denominated capital market in China 
(Chen, 2016). Whereas quotas did not even reach $2 billion with its establishment in 2002, in 
2017 a total of 278 global financial institutions in 18 countries and regions have been granted 
licenses to invest a total amount of 87.3 billion via the RQFII program (Mingrui, 2017). In 
addition, in 2015 China established the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), an 
international renminbi payment and clearing system that acts an alternative to the mainly 
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dollar-denominated SWIFT payment system. This has boosted the renminbi significantly in 
international transactions (Deutsche Bank, 2015).  
 Another significant milestone for the Chinese efforts to internationalize its currency 
has been the inclusion of the renminbi to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket of the 
IMF on October 1
st
 2016, joining the U.S. dollar, euro, yen and the British Pound. It is 
important to stress this inclusion, as it enhances the international attractiveness of the 
renminbi as an international reserve currency relative to the dollar (Taplin, 2016). Also, it is 
an evident sign that – despite not fully meeting the inclusion criteria – the IMF acknowledges 
China’s economic and monetary ascendency, paving the way for further integration of the 
Chinese renminbi in the global financial system (Lo, 2016). This inclusion demonstrates that 
the renminbi is becoming a more credible and stable alternative to the U.S. dollar, despite the 
fact that the SDR’s basket composition itself is still greatly dominated by dollars – the share 
of the total SDR value is 41,7% determined by the dollar versus 10,9% by the renminbi (see 
figure 12). Its inclusion has come at the expense of other currencies – including the dollar- in 
the basket, and is likely to lead to a higher international demand for the renminbi. The 
significance of SDR’s lies in the fact that the IMF could use them for bailouts in times of 
financial crisis and panic. Since the SDR were created in 1969, they have been used three 
times (1969, 1979 & 2009) in periods when global confidence in the dollar was under 
pressure (Rickards, 2014).   
 
 
 
 
 
                  Figure 12: Current SDR composition (Winton, 2015b) 
 
Moreover, the SDR  – also called the de facto international money of the IMF - is increasingly 
mentioned by the BRICS as an ideal building block to reform the ‘flawed’ fiat currency 
system where the dollar has the role of global currency reserve. Indeed, also the IMF is 
advocating for a larger role of SDR’s as global reserve assets, instead of dollars (Nel, Nabers 
& Hanif, 2015). At the fifth BRICS summit (2013) in Durban, South Africa the BRICS-
representatives provided a joint declaration in which they clearly articulated their position 
regarding a reform of the international monetary system: 
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“We support the reform and improvement of the international monetary system, with a broad-
based international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. We welcome 
the discussion about the role of the SDR in the existing international monetary system 
including the composition of the SDR’s basket of currencies” (Nel, Nabers & Hanif, 2015, pp. 
26).  
-Joint declaration BRICS-representatives, March 2013 
 Although there are increasingly calls for monetary reforms, and initiatives to create 
parallel currency systems – examples include the proposed gold dinar by Colonel Kaddafi in 
the African Union (AU), the Gulf Dinar of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and renminbi 
initiatives of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – the question remains whether 
the renminbi will be able to severely compete with the U.S. dollar on the short-term. Looking 
to figure 13 the renminbi/yuan (4,0%) is still way behind the dollar (87,6%) as a means of 
exchange, despite the fact that the renminbi doubled its share between 2013 and 2016.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 13: Most Traded Currencies By Value (Desjardins, 2016). 
 Moreover, apart from the fact that the volume of renminbi turnover is too small to 
serve as a global currency reserve, the connected benefits with such a status – seigniorage, 
more flexibility in its macroeconomic and monetary policy, a possible increase of its political 
power – may not weigh up against the costs on the short-term. Costs include an appreciation 
of the renminbi - which devalues the worth of its U.S. treasury bonds and hurts its export 
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position – and the taking up of a global leadership role, which they have to balance with their 
own domestic monetary policy (Kwon, 2015). In other words, although it is not expected that 
the renminbi replaces the dollar as a currency reserve on the short term, there is an evident 
trend in which the renminbi plays an increasingly important role in the international political 
economy and thus challenges the dollar.  
 The third and final trend refers to a vast increase in gold accumulation among central 
banks – mainly China and Russia - around the world since the 2008 financial crisis. This 
includes the launch of gold repatriation programs of countries - such as Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Belgium & Venezuela – to return their physical gold bullion mainly 
stored in the vaults of the Fed in New York, and Bank of England in London. Germany’s 
Bundesbank, for instance, has even sped up its planned schedule and by the end of 2017 
Germany will have half of its gold reserves back home (Framke, 2017). Although gold 
accumulation in itself is not a threat to the U.S. dollar as global currency reserve, it could 
point to a perceived vulnerability to the U.S. dollar, or to its collapse in the near future. 
Another theoretical incentive behind gold accumulation could be a long-term Chinese policy 
to make the renminbi convertible into a gold at a fixed rate, comparable to the gold-exchange 
standard (Rickards, 2014). Generally speaking, a significant amount of gold reserves is seen 
as a tool to diversify currency risks, a safe store of value, and a safe investment asset for 
volatile economic conditions (Cohen, 2008). Since 2008 more than 2,800 tons of bullion or 
9,4% of reserves has been added. The developed countries have on average conserved their 
stock, while ‘developing countries’ – led by China and Russia - have been accumulating 
relatively large amounts of bullion (Obyrne, 2015). Both figure 14 and figure 15 demonstrate 
this trend of accumulating gold reserves by the central banks of Russia and China. The gold 
reserves China are expected to be even higher because of its own not fully disclosed gold 
mine production, and the unreliability of the data provided by the Beijing government. Apart 
from the state, other Chinese entities – mainly the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) and the Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC) -  are also rumored to have been 
buying large amounts of gold, which would make China allegedly the de facto second largest 
holder of gold reserves (Obyrne, 2015). Nevertheless, the official amount of Chinese and 
Russian gold reserves is still rather small compared to the gold stock of France (apx. 2430 
tons), Italy (apx. 2450 tons), Germany (3,381 tons) and the United States (apx. 8,130 tons) 
(Holmes, 2016).  
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  Figure 14: Russia Gold Reserves (Tradingeconomics, 2017d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
  Figure 15: China Gold Reserves (Tradingeconomics 2017e) 
The fiat currency standard and volatility in exchange rates 
When comparing the exchange rate volatility during the fiat currency system (see figure 16) 
with the exchange rate volatility during the gold-exchange standard (see figure 2) it is evident 
that the fluctuation of the major currencies has significantly increased during the fiat currency 
system. The higher the volatility, the more it contributes to international economic instability, 
according to the IMF. Three main features of the fiat currency system could explain this rise 
in fluctuation.  
 The first feature is the floating exchange rate system since March 1973, replacing the 
adjustable peg currency regime of the Bretton Woods System. Although this system is valued 
for its advantages – such as an increase in global market efficiency, its function of automatic 
stabilization and monetary flexibility  – it has also contributed to an increase of fluctuation, 
uncertainty and difficulties with the long-term allocation of resources. When a country is 
faced with a highly volatile currency and unexpected currency shocks, it is harder to plan the 
most efficient allocation of resources for its economy in the long run (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 
1995). Still, not all global central banks have joined the floating exchange rate system. A 
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powerful example is the Chinese renminbi, which is pegged against a weighed basket of 
currencies – including emerging-market currencies – and is often blamed by the United States 
for keeping the renminbi artificially low, leading to a larger U.S. trade and current account 
deficit.  According to estimates the renminbi is undervalued by 15% to 40% (Kroeber, 2011). 
 Second, under a fiat currency system there is no scarce commodity limiting the U.S. 
monetary policy and credit creation, as long there is global confidence and trust in the dollar. 
Extra credit creation could arguably even reduce exchange rate volatility by stimulating the 
economy in times of financial crisis. However, the more liquidity is pumped into the system – 
for instance by means of QE – the likelier it is that liquidity-driven booms and busts are 
created in a business cycle, intensifying exchange rate volatility. Indeed, excessive money 
creation – leading to an unhealthy balance sheet of the Fed and contributing to current 
account deficits and public debt – could even undermine the very foundation the whole fiat 
currency system is based on: confidence (Rickards, 2014).  
 Third, the liberalization of capital controls of mostly European and North American 
markets contributed to higher capital mobility and thus exchange rate fluctuation (Hermele, 
2013). The 1997 Asian financial crisis demonstrated the heavily interconnected character of 
capital mobility and exchange rate volatility, and how they can reinforce each other in a 
downward or upward spiral. Whereas capital controls were an integral part of the gold-
exchange standard, the neoliberal ‘zeitgeist’ in the 70s and 80s led to the removing of most 
capital controls, and thus became a defining feature of the current fiat currency system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: The Pound, Yen, Deutschmark, French Franc and Euro against the Dollar 1973-2017 (Winton, 
2015c). 
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The fiat currency standard and inflation levels 
When comparing the inflation levels of the CPI-U index between the fiat currency system and 
the gold-exchange standard, it can undeniably be concluded that the average inflation level 
(4,07% versus 3,19%) during the fiat currency system (1971-2016) has been higher than 
during the gold-exchange standard (1944-1971). It could also be observed that the level of 
fluctuation of the CPI-U index during the fiat currency system is slightly higher than its 
counterpart (see figure 4). Comparing the CRB-index of both periods however, we could 
observe that apart from a higher frequency of significant ‘peaks’ during the fiat currency 
system that the level of fluctuation in this system has clearly increased as well (see figure 3 
and figure 4). These ‘significant’ peaks mainly refer to the years 1973, 1979 and 2008 when 
oil shocks caused a drop in supply or demand of oil. As the commodity ‘crude oil’ makes up 
the largest share of the CRB basket with 23%, it has a vast impact on the final fluctuation and 
inflation level of this index.  
 Although it is not the aim of this research to explore causality for this general inflation 
increase in the 1971-2016 period, we could dissect the variables defining the fiat currency 
system that give rise to a system that is more conducive to a higher level of inflation than the 
gold exchange standard. Looking to the core of the fiat currency system – fiat money – it is 
evident that this form of money has no intrinsic value, whereas commodity money – gold - 
during the gold-exchange standard had a fixed price of 35 dollars per ounce (Cohen, 2008).  
While the value of commodity money is thus mainly determined by both its convertibility to 
gold and the world’s total stock of gold, fiat money’s value depends on global confidence and 
its willingness to acquire assets denominated in this currency. By design fiat money has a 
higher tendency to fluctuate than commodity money, as it is backed by psychology rather than 
an intrinsic value (Bordo, 2003).  
 Looking to the design of the fiat currency system (1971-now) however there are more 
factors that could explain the rise in levels of inflation. First, when confidence and trust are 
engrained in the fiat currency system there is more flexibility for the U.S. in increasing its 
money supply to finance deficits or purchase commodities, such as oil. In other words, there 
is no risk of losing global confidence in a gold convertibility promise, such as under the gold-
exchange standard. However, when a sustained increase a country’s money supply grows 
faster than the rate of real output – total produced goods and services – it goes hand in hand 
with inflationary effects. Despite a relatively constant annual real GDP growth rate of the 
U.S. economy since 1945 (excluding years of recession), the ‘Money Zero Maturity’ (MZM) 
money supply of the United States has grown with an increasingly steep curve during the fiat 
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currency system. After abandoning the M3 variant as a measure for the money supply in 
2006, the MZM’s rate of growth has become the most accurate predictor for the Fed to 
foresee an increased threat of inflation and is therefore also used in this analysis (Belongia & 
Ireland, 2015). It derives its accuracy from its representation of all components (the 
accumulation of hard currency circulation, together with the total of checking, saving and 
money market accounts) that constitute the liquid money supply in a state’s economy; thus all 
money that is available and accessible for direct use and spending (Belongia & Ireland, 2015). 
While the MZM money stock during the full operational gold-exchange standard (1958-1971) 
was relatively stable and did not exceed $600 billion, the MZM money supply during the fiat 
currency (1971-now) has significantly grown from $600 billion in 1971 to around $14.825 
billion in May 2017, almost 25 times larger with an increase of 2471% (see figure 17).  
 
Figure 17: U.S. MZM Money Stock (Tradingeconomics, 2017f). 
 
It is evident that the design of the fiat currency system has laid the foundation for significantly 
larger credit creation than under the gold-exchange standard. Without a commodity constraint 
such as the gold anchor – and with global confidence and trust ensured – there is more 
incentive, especially for (re-) election purposes, to print money in order to finance possible 
deficits and/or stimulate the economy by means of rounds of QE.  
 Another component of the fiat currency system is the floating exchange rate regime 
and the connected easing of capital controls. Low capital controls are generally associated 
with a higher fluctuation of exchange rates, which could in turn impact the output of imports 
or exports. Although the strict causation of both a floating exchange rate regime versus 
inflation and capital controls versus inflation is subject to academic debate, they do pose an 
additional risk to the dynamics of money creation within a fiat currency system. The risk with 
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the Fed’s significant money creation –and resulting debt levels - together with the mentioned 
processes that bypass the U.S. dollar as global currency reserve, is that these factors arguably 
undermine slowly but surely the confidence of global central banks, financial institutes and 
investors in the U.S. dollar and thus the roles it plays on the world stage: a dominant store of 
value, means of exchange and unit of account.  
 Hypothetically, a tipping point – triggered by, for instance, a war or recession - could 
come into play where there is a long-term decline of this confidence in the U.S. dollar. In that 
scenario it will not only get more difficult – possibly even impossible – for the U.S. to finance 
its debt with new treasury bonds, but it will also face an increase in inflationary pressures, as 
global U.S. dollar assets are sold, leading to a significant inflow of globally hold dollars to the 
United States (Rickards, 2014). When consumers and businesses in the U.S. also lose 
confidence in the price stability of the dollar a wave of dollar dumping could ensue, where not 
only the dollars – reflecting real output – are dumped but also the billions of artificially 
created dollars by the Fed. When the velocity of this process intensifies price levels could turn 
into hyperinflation, and even into a default of the state’s economy (Rickards, 2014). An 
absence of strict capital controls facilitates the process of exchanging dollar-denominated 
assets, while a floating exchange rate system could lead – without intervention of the Fed or 
IMF - to a massive depreciation of the dollar relative to other global key currencies. In other 
words, both the absence of these capital controls and the presence of a floating exchange 
regime within the current fiat currency system could arguably enhance an inflationary risk of 
the U.S. dollar in the future.  
 
The fiat currency standard and large swings in economic activity 
In this section we will further analyse the amount of recessions and swings in economic 
activity during the fiat currency system – the final two IMF variables determining 
international economic stability. A couple of observations could be made when comparing the 
performance of these variables between both systems. First, when strictly looking to the 
amount of recessionary periods – negative real GDP growth for a period of 6 months or 
longer - during the current fiat currency system (1971 - now), we could observe an equal 
amount of recessions as the during the gold-exchange standard. Six recessions could be 
discerned in the periods: (1) November 1973 – March 1975, (2) January 1980 – July 1980, (3) 
July 1981 – November 1982, (4) July 1990 – March 1991, (5) March 2001 – November 2001 
and (6) December 2007 – June 2009 (Amadeo, 2017). Second, although the average duration 
of a recession has slightly increased from 9,67 months to 12 months in the current fiat 
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currency system, the average domestic GDP growth rate of the US and the world in general 
has decreased under the fiat currency system (Taylor et al, 2012). When looking to the US 
GDP growth rate in figure 18 we could observe that the blue line provides smaller 
fluctuations during the fiat currency system than during the gold-exchange standard. Not only 
the average level of fluctuations has become smaller, but also general growth rates – in both 
the increase and decrease in output - show a substantial relative decline during the fiat system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: US GDP Growth Rate (Tradingeconomics, 2017g).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19:  GDP Growth Rate world (World Bank, 2017).  
When looking to the GDP growth rate of the world however in figure 19, we could see that - 
in contrast to the US GDP growth rate – the level of fluctuation has in fact significantly 
increased during the fiat currency system. Also here we could observe lower amounts of 
average growth than during the gold-exchange standard. Moreover, while all financial crises 
during the gold-exchange standard the world’s GDP growth rate remained positive, the 
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financial crisis of 2008 is the only period of time during the fiat currency system that this 
growth rate became negative (-1,704%). The fact that the average GDP of the world  - in 
contrast to the US GDP growth rate – has almost structurally remained positive could be 
attributed to, inter alia, countries such as China and the Asian tigers that at times experienced 
double digit growth rates. These countries’ growth rates have thus compensated the negative 
growth rates, such as periodical financial crises that the United States has experienced.  
 The alleged positive side of a fiat currency system is that the central bank of the 
provider of the global currency reserve – the U.S. Fed - has the opportunity to pump money 
into the economy during recessions in order to prevent a deflationary spiral. Indeed, research 
has shown that the Fed’s QE program during the 2008 financial crisis has reduced the 
widespread ramifications of the crisis, as it triggered lower mortgage interest rates, a 
reduction in borrowing costs and - most importantly - a slight restoration financial and 
psychological stability in the U.S. and world markets (Hirst, 2014). Without this monetary 
program – which would have been practically impossible under the gold-exchange standard - 
some analysts argue that it could have spiralled to a worse crisis than the Great Depression in 
the early 30s (Hirst, 2014).  
 Nevertheless, irrespective of the program’s effect on the intensity of the financial 
crisis, it has dramatically worsened the balance sheet of the Fed (see figure 19), contributed to 
higher debt levels and arguably accelerated a global trend of bypassing the U.S. dollar. 
Indeed, the Fed’s meddling in both the stock and bond market might have – inter alia – has 
not only contributed to a surge of stocks since 2008 (250%, according to S&P500), but it has 
also led to an increased dependency of these markets on the Fed’s QE-programs and its future 
policies to unload its assets (Cox, 2017). In essence, the Fed has two options for reducing its 
balance sheet: either let the assets roll off automatically and reduce its reinvesting in 
mortgage-backed securities holdings in the System Open Market Account (SOMA), or initiate 
the active sale of its bonds before their maturity dates (Cox, 2017). As the latter option could 
create an unstable bubble and trigger an interest rate increase, the Fed’s Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) has stated in a press release in 2014 to prefer the former:  
 
“The Committee intends to reduce the Federal Reserve's securities holdings in a gradual and 
predictable manner primarily by ceasing to reinvest repayments of principal on securities” 
(Policy Normalization Principles and Plans, 2014).  
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Figure 20: US Central Bank Balance Sheet (Tradingeconomics, 2017h).  
 Although this quote of 2014 clearly indicates the Fed’s intention to shrink its balance 
sheet, the Fed has refused since then to gradually cease its principal reinvestments in practice 
– a process called ‘tapering’. This is reflected in figure 19, which indicates a stable level of a 
$4,5 trillion balance sheet since the year 2014. The timing for this process is crucial as it 
could trigger market disturbances and disproportionately high interest rates - the due date for 
this process is rumoured to be in April 2018 (Leong, 2017). However, if another cyclical 
financial crisis would hit the U.S. and world economy in the meantime, it might even be 
necessary to expand the Fed’s balance sheet even further. This additional credit creation 
would not only have a negative effect on the Fed’s balance sheet, but also on the U.S. debt 
levels, pose an additional risk for (hyper-) inflation, and undermine the global confidence in 
the dollar – the construct where the whole system is based on. In other words, although the 
causal link between monetary systems and fluctuation in economic activity might be subject 
to debate, it could be argued that the fundamentals of the fiat currency standard has stronger 
built-in risk factors – than the gold-exchange standard - that could enhance the fluctuation of 
economic activity and deepen the intensity of recessions in the long run.   
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Comparative chart  
When comparing the impact of the design of the Bretton Woods gold-exchange standard and 
the fiat currency system on international economic stability, we could derive a couple of 
observations, which are stated below in figure 20.  
  
 
Core power 
dynamics 
 
 
Volatility 
exchange rates 
 
 
Level of inflation 
 
 
Large swings in 
economic activity  
Bretton Woods 
gold-exchange 
standard (1944-
1971) 
U.S. dollar as 
global currency 
reserve, and 
convertible to gold 
at fixed price of 
35$ per ounce. 
(Commodity- 
money based 
system) 
Exchange rates of 
the major global 
currencies have 
been rather stable 
Low levels of 
inflation and 
limited fluctuation. 
(Except for minor 
deviations during 
the first post-WWII 
years and the three 
years before the 
Nixon shock)  
Six financial crises 
could be recorded. 
These recessions 
were relatively 
brief and marginal. 
Moreover, no 
disproportionate 
fluctuations in 
output could be 
observed. 
Fiat currency 
system 
(1971 - now) 
U.S. dollar as 
global currency 
reserve, and backed 
by global 
confidence.  
(Fiat money -based 
system) 
Exchange rate of 
major global 
currenciesvolatility 
has significantly 
increased.  
Not only the 
average level of 
inflation has 
increased, but also 
higher ‘peaks’ and 
greater range of 
fluctuation could be 
observed 
Six financial crises 
could be recorded. 
The average 
duration of a 
recession increased. 
Also, on average 
the world GDP 
growth rate 
decreased, and its 
fluctuation slightly 
increased 
Figure 21: Comparative table findings Bretton Woods gold-exchange standard versus fiat currency standard 
Strictly looking to these results – and applying the IMF economic indicators - it could be 
argued that the international economic system has become more unstable during the fiat 
currency system. Not only has the exchange rate volatility significantly increased during the 
fiat currency system – compared to the gold-exchange standard – but also the average level of 
inflation has increased. Moreover, higher peaks and a greater range of fluctuation in inflation 
levels could be observed. Indeed, although an equal amount of financial recessions could be 
recorded during both monetary systems, the average duration of a recession has increased 
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during the fiat currency system. Lastly, whereas the average GDP growth levels of the world 
decreased, a larger fluctuation in this growth rate could be detected during the fiat currency 
system. In short, it could thus be argued that all IMF indicators point to an increase in 
instability in the international economic system.  
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Conclusion 
The aim of this research has been to shed light on the question whether a decline of the 
Bretton Woods hegemonic order has led to greater instability in the international economic 
system. It has firstly been established that the United States has performed the role of 
hegemon, and that the dollar has served as global currency reserve in both the gold-exchange 
standard and the fiat currency standard. When applying the Hegemonic Stability Theory it 
would lead us to assume that this hegemonic status would guarantee international economic 
stability. However, this comparative analysis has demonstrated that the transition from one 
monetary system to the other has fundamentally altered the nature of U.S. monetary power, 
and in fact – based on the economic indicators of the IMF - destabilized the international 
economic system. While gold and a connected convertibility promise were central to the gold-
exchange standard, it has been global confidence in the U.S. dollar in the current fiat currency 
system. These observations would confirm the hypothesis.  
 Strictly speaking, it could be considered true that the design of the fiat currency 
system has significantly strengthened the so-called ‘power to delay’ of Cohen (2005), which 
stands at the core of U.S. monetary power. While gold and a fixed-exchange rate system 
served as a constraint on the monetary capabilities of the U.S., the fiat money based system 
has paved the way for the U.S. to significantly delay its balance of payments, finance its trade 
deficits and launch QE-programs in times of financial crisis in order to reinvigorate not only 
its own economy, but the world economy as well. Without any backing but confidence, the 
dollar is still the most widely internationalized global currency reserve in human history. 
Network externalities, the global custom to invest or trade in dollars, and the huge amounts of 
treasury bonds, foreign exchange reserves and other financial products denominated in dollars 
keep the ‘dollar-show’ going. However, although this power to delay has been strengthened, 
this development goes hand in hand with additional risks – to undermining the global 
confidence in the U.S. dollar - that are built in the design of a fiat currency system.  
 First, already the fact a national currency – the dollar - is used as the world’s global 
currency reserve it also means that the United States must run capital account deficits in order 
to provide sufficient amounts of liquidity around the world. This built-in Triffin dilemma 
could also be seen with the gold-exchange standard. Second, apart from providing global 
liquidity, the design of this system has provided the U.S. an easy way out to finance its trade 
deficits with printed money. In times of crises, credit creation might have proven to be helpful 
tool to prevent deflationary spirals. However, the inevitable result has been soaring federal 
debt levels, the worst balance sheet of the Fed since its establishment in 1913, and a 
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disproportionate amount of dollars around the world that do not accurately reflect the real 
amount of produced goods and services. It has been shown that the upward spiral of U.S. 
money supply and federal debt is not likely to halt in the near future; a development that begs 
the question: How much debt can the U.S. collect until it leads to breaking point when global 
confidence in the U.S. dollar plunges? The research has shown that the financial crisis of 
2008 has already accelerated –especially among the BRICS – a global trend to decrease the 
dependency on the dollar, and implement, inter alia, BSA’s, currency unions and non-dollar 
international payment systems. This trend where the dollar is becoming less important as a 
medium of exchange for international transactions is likely to continue. Also here would be 
the question: could bypassing the U.S. dollar marginalize its position as global currency 
reserve, leading to a global confidence crisis in the dollar? For now, it could be fair to 
conclude that in the near future the dollar will remain the dominant global currency reserve, 
despite the global non-dollar instruments that present themselves as alternatives or threats. It 
is by far the most widely used means of exchange, which is backed by a powerful hegemon 
that has – apart from its monetary power – strong military, economic and political power 
resources at its disposal.  
 Nevertheless, the foundation of this system remains fragile. Global confidence is hard 
to measure and can change in a split second. The inherent flaw of this fiat currency system is 
that when global confidence plunges, there is no safety net. Especially not when the balance 
sheet of the Fed is in a bad shape, interest rates are almost zero, and the rising federal debt 
level is the highest amount in U.S. history. This means that when a trigger event –ranging 
from a financial crisis, financial warfare, to a massive Treasury bond sale by China, or a 
large-scale war - leads to a loss of confidence in the dollar, this spiral will be difficult to stop 
and could lead to the global dumping of the dollar. With this flaw in mind, together with the 
increase of global non-dollar instruments for exchange it would be wise for the U.S. to 
envision a global summit in the near future - a ‘Bretton Woods Conference 2.0’ – where the 
international monetary system could be adequately updated. Historically speaking, the 
lifecycle of monetary systems is on average 30-40 years, which means this system is overdue. 
However, it is not deemed likely – and possibly not even feasible – for the U.S. to give up its 
profitable global currency reserve and voluntarily transition to a newly designed basket of 
currencies, gold standard or a SDR-centered global currency. It is thus waiting for a trigger 
event that forces the United States in transitioning to a new design of the international 
monetary system.  
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 In conclusion, although the IMF indicators have shown that the stability of the 
international system has been more unstable under the fiat currency system than under the 
gold-exchange standard, the design of the fiat currency system itself points to a deeper 
underlying dynamic that is more cause of concern: the high debt levels, deficit spending, QE 
programs, the Fed’s unsustainable balance sheet, and the bypassing of the U.S. dollar have 
had an undermining effect on the global confidence in the U.S. dollar. The strength of the fiat 
system – the power to delay – has thus proven to be its weakness as well. Without global 
confidence, the current functioning international monetary system will not function: the more 
people around the world lose confidence in the U.S. dollar, the greater the instability of the 
international economic system will be. The fiat currency design has thus paved the way for 
the very processes that undermine its own strength. In other words, it is thus not necessarily 
only the hegemonic power status of the United States that determines the stability of the 
international economic system, but the design of the international monetary system has an 
enormous influence as well. Its hegemonic power status is heavily engrained in the current 
design of the international monetary system. Any deliberate or natural – by market forces – 
adjustment to the design of the current fiat currency system in the future is thus most likely to 
have substantial negative consequences for the stability of the international economic system 
in general.  
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